No. 03 / 01-1242Supreme Court of Iowa.
Filed February 26, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis I. Reis, Judge.
Appellant challenges district court order applying doctrine of res judicata to bar suit. AFFIRMED.
John Francis Anderson, Des Moines, pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Christie J. Scase, Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, John Francis Anderson, challenges the district court’s dismissal of his suit against the City Development Board and Iowa Attorney General for declaratory judgment and mandamus. Finding no error, we affirm.
This suit concerns a dispute over a ten-year annexing moratorium agreement between the City of Des Moines and the City of Carlisle. In a prior action brought by Anderson, this court held that the agreement was valid, thereby preventing the citizens of West Carlisle (led by Anderson) from involuntarily annexing themselves to the City of Carlisle. Anderson v. City Dev. Bd., 631 N.W.2d 671, 676-77 (Iowa 2001). While that appeal was pending, Anderson commenced this suit against the City Development Board (CDB) and Attorney General for declaratory judgment and mandamus. As the district court correctly observed, however, this second suit by Anderson is no more than an attempt to relitigate issues already raised (and subsequently decided) in Anderson I.
Fundamental principles of res judicata compel the dismissal of Anderson’s suit. The doctrine of res judicata incorporates both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Robbins v. Heritage Acres, 578 N.W.2d 262, 265 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Issue preclusion prevents a party to a previous action from relitigating issues that were raised and resolved in a prior action. Penn v. Iowa State Bd. of Regents, 577 N.W.2d 393, 398 (Iowa 1998); Brown v. Kassouf, 558 N.W.2d 161, 163 (Iowa 1997). Application of the doctrine protects parties and the courts from the vexatious aspects of repeated litigation, including its cost. Penn, 577 N.W.2d at 398.
Before issue preclusion can apply, four prerequisites must be established:
(1) [t]he issue concluded must be identical; (2) [t]he issue must have been raised and litigated in the prior action; (3) [t]he issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action; and (4) [t]he determination made of the issue in the prior action must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.
Brown, 558 N.W.2d at 163. In addition, there must be mutuality — also known as privity — “between the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked and the party against whom the issue was decided in the first litigation.” Id. The privity rule is relaxed, however, when the doctrine is used defensively and
the party against whom issue preclusion is invoked was `so connected in interest with one of the parties in the former action as to have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant claim or issue and be properly bound by its resolution.’
Id. (quoting Opheim v. Am. Interinsurance Exch., 430 N.W.2d 118, 120 (Iowa 1988)).
Application of the doctrine is easily established by both defendants here. Anderson’s petition claims the moratorium agreement was not properly enacted and is therefore invalid, that the City Development Board applied the annexation laws incorrectly, and that the CDB and the Attorney General violated the constitutional rights of Iowa citizens in their interpretation and enforcement of pertinent statutes. Although cloaked in slightly different language, these claims are identical to those concluded in the prior suit. See Anderson I, 631 N.W.2d at 675-76 (moratorium agreement properly enacted and required to be enforced). The same issues were also raised and litigated in the prior action, fulfilling the second requirement for issue preclusion. Id. at 675. (“On appeal, Anderson argues that the moratorium agreement was invalid because proper procedures were not followed.”) Those issues were plainly material and relevant to the outcome of the previous litigation; otherwise Anderson would have prevailed instead of the CDB. Obviously the prior decision was “necessary and essential” to the outcome of the previous case. Brown, 558 N.W.2d at 163.
Because Anderson was a party to the previous litigation and had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, the Attorney General — although a stranger to Anderson’s prior suit against the CDB — may rely on the prior judgment as conclusively establishing the merits of its defense in its favor. Brown, 558 N.W.2d at 164. Anderson’s arguments to the contrary are entirely without merit. We therefore affirm the district court’s order of dismissal in favor of both CDB and the Attorney General.
AFFIRMED.