No. 4-420 / 03-1843.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
July 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Dale B. Hagen, Judge.
Beverly Bender appeals the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Dennis Hopkins in this medical malpractice action. AFFIRMED.
A. Zane Blessum, Winterset, and Catherine Levine, Des Moines, for appellant.
Kermit Anderson of Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, Craig, Hilmes
Gaffney, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Miller, JJ.
HUITINK, J.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
On August 30, 2000, Beverly Bender had a “maintenance” spinal adjustment treatment by her chiropractor, Dennis Hopkins. Bender immediately experienced pain in her lower back. She returned to Hopkins several times between August 30 and her final visit on December 22, 2000, but her back pain did not improve. Bender had a MRI on January 2, 2001 and was diagnosed with a herniated disc. She subsequently had surgery on her back.
On December 24, 2002, Bender filed a medical malpractice action against Hopkins. Hopkins filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming Bender’s action was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court determined Bender knew of her injury on August 30, 2000, and the statute of limitations began to run on this date. The court concluded Bender’s suit was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. See Iowa Code § 614.1(9) (2001).
Bender claimed the statute of limitations should be tolled by the continuous treatment doctrine. The court found Bender had alleged a single act of negligence, and because of a “single act” exception, the continuous treatment doctrine would not toll the statute of limitations in this case. Bender appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment for correction of errors of law. Financial Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. Hawkeye Bank Trust, 588 N.W.2d 450, 455 (Iowa 1999). Summary judgment will be upheld when the moving party shows there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Crippen v. City of Cedar Rapids, 618 N.W.2d 562, 565 (Iowa 2000).
III. Statute of Limitations
Iowa Code section 614.1(9) provides that a medical malpractice lawsuit must be filed
within two years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of, the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action. . . .
The term “injury,” as used in this section, means physical harm as distinguished from the act causing the injury. Schlote v. Dawson, 676 N.W.2d 187, 193 (Iowa 2004).
The statute of limitations begins to run at the time of injury, even though a plaintiff is unaware of the causal relationship between the injury and the defendant’s conduct. Id. at 194. The limitations period is the legislatively mandated time for an injured person to investigate and file a medical malpractice lawsuit. Sparks v. Metalcraft, Inc., 408 N.W.2d 347, 351 (Iowa 1987).
The evidence presented in support of the summary judgment motion clearly shows Bender knew her injury began on August 30, 2000. In a letter to her attorney, Bender stated, “I was in great physical condition . . . until that incident in which Dr. Hopkins destroyed it in one quick, tremendous twist and herniated my disc.” Bender also indicated to others that her back pain began on August 30, 2000. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the statute of limitations began to run on August 30, 2000, and that Bender’s suit, filed on December 24, 2002, was barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in section 614.1(9).
IV. Continuous Treatment Doctrine
Our supreme court has noted that other jurisdictions have held that when a plaintiff receives continuing care for the same injury from a medical practitioner whose malpractice is at issue, the statute of limitations may be tolled until the treatment ceases. McClendon v. Beck, 569 N.W.2d 382, 385 (Iowa 1997). Iowa, however, has not yet applied this continuous treatment doctrine. Id.; Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 522 (Iowa 1995).
On this issue the district court concluded:
“According to the single act exception, if there is a single act of malpractice, subsequent time and effort to merely remedy or cure that act does not toll the statute of limitations.” Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 521. In the December 24, 2002 Petition, Bender alleges a single act of malpractice on the part of Hopkins occurring on August 30, 2000. Moreover, the facts demonstrate that Bender believed she was injured by “one quick, tremendous twist” occurring on August 30, 2000. Therefore, the case before the Court involves a single act of negligence occurring on August 30, 2000. Consequently, even if the continuing treatment doctrine does apply to Iowa Code § (14.1(9), it would not apply to the case before this Court because any subsequent treatment provided by Hopkins to remedy the injury caused by him on August 30, 2000, would not toll the statute of limitations pursuant to the “single act” exception to the continuing treatment doctrine.
We concur in the district court’s consideration of this issue. We determine the “single act” exception would preclude application of the continuous treatment doctrine under the facts of this case. See Langner, 533 N.W.2d at 521.
We affirm the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Hopkins.
AFFIRMED.