CARLSON v. IOWA DEPT. OF TRANSP., 715 N.W.2d 769 (Iowa App. 2006)

No. 6-076 / 05-0564Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed March 29, 2006

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Kurt L. Wilke, Judge.

The Iowa Department of Transportation appeals from the district court order rescinding Jerrod Carlson’s license revocation.REVERSED.

Mark Crimmons of Bennett, Crimmins, Ostrander Young, Fort Dodge, for appellee.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General and David Ferree, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.

EISENHAUER, J.

The question presented to us on appeal is whether Jerrod Carlson proved he was incapable of rendering consent when he refused a request for a blood alcohol test. Based on the reasoning below, we conclude he did not.

Carlson was injured in the crash of an ATV he was driving on July 7, 2004. He was taken to the hospital where Deputy Michael Halligan suspected Carlson was intoxicated. Deputy Halligan asked Carlson several times to submit to blood and urine tests. Carlson did not respond, instead repeatedly asking what had occurred. Deputy Halligan believed that although Carlson appeared confused, he understood the request. Deputy Halligan marked on the implied consent form that Carlson refused to submit urine or blood for testing. Carlson refused to sign the form.

Because this was his second revocation, the Iowa Department of Transportation (IDOT) revoked Carlson’s license for two years pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.9 (2003). After a hearing, the revocation was rescinded by the administrative law judge. The administrative law judge’s decision in turn was reversed by the director of the IDOT. Finally, the district court reinstated the administrative law judge’s holding. The court reinstated the license because it found Carlson was confused and Deputy Halligan should have proceeded under section 321J.7 to obtain a physician’s certification that Carlson was unable to give consent.

Our review of a district court’s decision on judicial review of an agency action is confined to whether the court correctly applied the law. Wieslander v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 596 N.W.2d 516, 520 (Iowa 1999).

A person who operates a motor vehicle in this State under circumstances giving a law enforcement officer reasonable grounds to believe the person is intoxicated is deemed to have consented to a test to determine blood alcohol content. Iowa Code §321J.6(1). Iowa Code section 321J.7 provides the means for testing if a person is “otherwise in a condition rendering the person incapable of consent or refusal.” The officer in such an instance may give the test after obtaining a physician’s certification that the person is in such a condition. Iowa Code §321J.7.

The burden of proof to show the inadmissibility of the blood alcohol test is upon Carlson. See Mary v. IDOT, 382 N.W.2d 128, 132 (Iowa Ct.App. 1986). We conclude the IDOT properly determined Carlson did not meet his burden of proof. The only evidence Carlson presented at the hearing was a list of medications he was given at the hospital, internet documents detailing the effects of the medications, and Carlson’s testimony that he did not recall the accident or any of the proceedings at the hospital. However, after Deputy Halligan asked for consent, Carlson stated he understood what he was being told. Carlson failed to present expert or medical testimony to support his assertion he was incapable of consenting or refusing consent. As the IDOT noted, Carlson’s argument “does not rise above speculation.” Furthermore, confusion does not excuse a refusal to comply with the implied consent law. See Janssen v. Sellers, 207 N.W.2d 746, 747 (Iowa 1973). Accordingly, we reverse the district court and reinstate the IDOT’s decision revoking Carlson’s driving privileges.

REVERSED.