No. 4-007 / 02-1782Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed March 24, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert D. Wilson, Judge.
The petitioner appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review affirming the chief deputy workers’ compensation commissioner’s dismissal of an intra-agency appeal. REVERSED ANDREMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Richard R. Schmidt of Berg, Rouse, Spaulding Schmidt, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Jennifer A. Clendenin of Ahlers Cooney, P.C., Des Moines, for respondent-appellee.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Craig Kelinson, Special Assistant Attorney General, for intervenor-appellee.
Heard by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
HECHT, J.
The petitioner, Kelli Cooper, appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review affirming the chief deputy workers’ compensation commissioner’s dismissal of an intra-agency appeal from an arbitration decision denying Cooper workers’ compensation benefits. We reverse and remand to the agency for further proceedings.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
On May 21, 1999, Kelli Cooper filed two petitions for arbitration before the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commission. An arbitration hearing was held, and both parties filed post-hearing briefs. On August 9, 2000, the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner filed an arbitration decision denying Cooper workers’ compensation benefits. Cooper sought intra-agency review. On September 27, 2000, she filed a copy of the hearing transcript. Although according to agency rule her appellate brief was due by October 17, 2000, Cooper concluded her post-hearing brief adequately addressed the issues on appeal and decided not to file an appellate brief. On November 6, 2000, she filed a notice of intent not to file a brief. Maytag subsequently filed an appellate brief addressing the issues raised in Cooper’s post-hearing brief.
On March 13, 2001, the chief deputy workers’ compensation commissioner issued an order to show cause, notifying Cooper that her post-hearing brief did not conform to the rules regarding appellate briefs and ordering her to “show cause as to why this appeal should not be dismissed.” The order did not provide Cooper an opportunity to file a conforming brief. Cooper filed a response as ordered, but the chief deputy commissioner dismissed the appeal on May 29, 2001. The chief deputy concluded the Iowa Supreme Court’s holding in Aluminum Co. of America v. Musal, 622 N.W.2d 476 (Iowa 2001) prevented it from hearing Cooper’s appeal without a conforming appellate brief. It further concluded no compelling reason existed to take the appeal sua sponte.
Cooper appealed the dismissal to the Polk County District Court, which affirmed the chief deputy’s decision. Cooper appeals, contending her intra-agency appeal was not precluded by Musal
and that the agency abused its discretion by dismissing her appeal.
Standard of Review.
We may reverse an agency decision if it is affected by an error of law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2001). We will grant the requested relief if the petitioning party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced and the agency exceeded its statutory authority or abused its discretion. Sioux City Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Iowa Dept. of Ed., 659 N.W.2d 563, 566 (Iowa 2003). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the action must be unreasonable or lack rationality under the attendant circumstances. Id. An abuse of discretion is synonymous with unreasonableness. Id.
Discussion.
An intra-agency appeal may be heard by the workers’ compensation commissioner in one of two ways: (1) the losing party may appeal from an adverse arbitration decision; or (2) the commissioner may take the appeal sua sponte. Musal, 622 N.W.2d at 478. In its ruling on its order to show cause, the chief deputy concluded the holding in Musal precluded Cooper’s appeal under the first option because Cooper had not filed a conforming brief. Deciding no compelling reason existed to take the appea sua sponte, the chief deputy cited Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.36 and dismissed Cooper’s appeal.
Musal involved an intra-agency appeal in which no appellate brief was filed by either party. Musal, 622 N.W.2d at 477. The workers’ compensation commissioner, after the case sat dormant for over a year, modified the deputy’s decision after considering the appeal “generally and without regard to particular issues.”Id. On appeal, our supreme court determined that the commissioner’s review of the case violated the due process rights of the employer who was given no notice of the issues to be considered or an opportunity to present arguments on those issues. Id. at 479. The supreme court concluded that although Musal did not submit a brief identifying the issues on appeal, the commissioner could still review the case sua sponte, but only after notifying the parties of the issues to be considered and providing an opportunity to submit arguments on those issues Id. at 480. The supreme court remanded the case to the agency, giving the “commissioner the option of imposing sanctions or notifying the parties of the review to be taken.” Id.
In the case at hand, we do not conclude, as did the chief deputy commissioner, that the holding in Musal is dispositive. The critical inquiry in Musal regarded the due process rights of the appellee-employer. Id. at 479. In the case at hand, we see no indication that Maytag’s due process rights would have been jeopardized by a review of Cooper’s intra-agency appeal by the chief deputy commissioner notwithstanding Cooper’s failure to file a brief. Maytag has made no argument, before the agency or before this court, that it did not receive due process — adequate notice or an opportunity to present arguments on its behalf in the appeal. In fact, Maytag submitted an appellate brief addressing the issues raised by Cooper in her post-hearing brief.
Having determined that Musal does not preclude intra-agency review of Cooper’s appeal, we must determine whether the chief deputy’s decision to impose the sanction of dismissal against Cooper for failing to file a conforming appellate brief was an abuse of discretion. Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.36
gives the agency discretion to dismiss a claim for a failure to comply with agency rules or orders. Although Cooper did not file a brief conforming to the rules on appellate briefs, she notified the commission and the emplooyer of her intent not to file an appellate brief and to rely on her post-hearing brief. Maytag filed a brief addressing the issues raised in Cooper’s post-hearing brief. The past practice of the workers’ compensation commission had been to consider appeals in which no briefs or non-conforming briefs were filed. See Bow v. Green Field Transport Co. Inc., No. 1208322 (Workers’ Comp. Comm. Jan. 31, 2001) (appeal considered although claimant-appellant did not file appeal brief, but employer-appellee did); Geahry v. AMPI,
Nos. 1231058 and 1231058 (Workers’ Comp Comm. Jan. 22, 2001) (appeal considered although appellant filed an untimely appeal brief which was not taken into account); Ellis v. Hy-Vee Inc.,
No. 1164826 (Workers’ Comp. Comm. Oct. 26, 2000) (appeal considered despite claimant’s failure to identify issues in its appeal brief); Larson v. Boys Girls Home, No. 1020255 (Workers’ Comp. Comm. Apr. 28, 2000) (appeal considered although claimant’s brief failed to identify issues on appeal and employer failed to file cross-appeal brief); Petersen v. Ida County, No. 1059986 (Workers’ Comp. Comm. June 25, 1998) (appeal considered although neither party filed an appeal brief). Although the chief deputy commissioner notified Cooper in its order to show cause that it was considering imposing sanctions for failing to file a conforming appellate brief, the chief deputy did not provide Cooper an opportunity to submit a conforming brief to avoid sanctions. Because of the severity of the sanction and because the chief deputy’s decision to dismiss the appeal for failure to file a brief on intra-agency appeal constituted a change in agency procedure, we conclude it was an abuse of discretion to impose the sanction of dismissal without providing Cooper an opportunity to file a brief. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(h).
Accordingly we reverse the decision of the district court and remand this matter to the workers’ compensation commissioner. The agency shall on remand either consider Cooper’s post-hearing brief as the claimant’s appeal brief, or provide Cooper an opportunity to submit a conforming appellate brief before imposing a sanction as drastic as dismissal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.