DELAGARDELLE v. LENIUS, 04-0428 (Iowa App. 12-8-2004)

No. 4-710 / 04-0428Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed December 8, 2004

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Grundy County, K.D. Briner, Judge.

Stephanie Lenius appeals the district court’s award of physical care to her child’s father, Blake Delagardelle. AFFIRMED.

Daniel Seufferlein of Dutton, Braun, Staack Hellman, P.L.C.Waterloo, for appellant.

Brandon Adams, Waterloo, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Hecht, JJ.

HECHT, J.

Stephanie Lenius appeals the district court’s award of physical care to her child’s father, Blake Delagardelle. We affirm.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

This appeal concerns the physical care award of Audery Janiee Delagardelle, who was born to Blake Delagardelle and Stephanie Lenius on August 22, 2001. Blake and Stephanie are employed full time. Blake has worked at Omega Cabinets in Waterloo for over two years, making ten dollars per hour. He has recently been assigned to a morning shift. Stephanie has held a variety of jobs since Audery’s birth, but is currently a clerk at Citgo making less than seven dollars per hour. She works mostly afternoon and evening hours. While the parties are at work, Audery is cared for by the parties’ extended families.

Both Blake and Stephanie sought custody and physical care of their daughter. The district court concluded Blake should have Audery’s physical care in part because of the significant participation of Blake’s mother and sister, who both have experience as nannies. The district court was apparently not similarly impressed by the quality assistance provided by Stephanie’s family and support network.

The district court found that this case presents circumstances in which the long-term best interest of Audery would be decided by “choosing the least detrimental alternative.” While finding that Stephanie had both (1) been the primary caregiver for the child’s first years, and (2) “devoted herself to Audery’s care,” the district court characterized Stephanie’s behavior as immature. The district court also questioned Stephanie’s parenting abilities, concluding that Stephanie provided an “extremely curtailed ability to offer a good future to Audery.”

With regard to Blake, the district court found that “[a]lthough Blake states that Audery is his primary concern, it is clear that he does not subordinate his own pursuits and pleasures to his parental responsibilities.” The court noted that Blake participates in many recreational activities, including bowling, softball and pool, when Audery is in his care. Despite this apparent failure to consistently conform his off-work priorities to those consistent with child care responsibilities, the district court awarded Audery’s physical care to Blake because of his “extended and active support system, his stable employment, and the wholesome nature of the family members he has associated with Audery. . . .” Thus the district court found that although “[b]oth parties are fit persons to exercise joint legal custody of Audery,” the extended family support available to Blake make him “the parent better able to give nurturing, guidance and care to Audrey.”

Stephanie now appeals the award of physical care to Blake, contending an objective view of the evidence in the record clearly shows that an award of physical care to Stephanie would be in the child’s best interest. She emphasizes the finding that while she had subordinated her own interests to Audery’s, the district court concluded that Blake had not. Stephanie also specifically directs our attention to (1) the apparent abuse that she had suffered at the hand of Blake, (2) a number of injuries and accidents Audrey has had while in Blake’s care, and (3) the less than wholesome environment at the recreational events to which Blake sometimes takes Audery. In the event we do not award physical care to Stephanie, she contends an award of joint physical care is appropriate pursuant to Iowa Code section 598.41(5) (2003).

II. Scope of Review.

We review custody and physical care determinations de novo. In re Marriage of Forbes, 570 N.W.2d 757, 759 (Iowa 1997). We base our decision primarily on the particular circumstances of the parties before us. In re Marriage of Kleist, 538 N.W.2d 273, 276 (Iowa 1995). We give weight to the findings of the district court, who had the opportunity to view the demeanor of the witnesses when testifying, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g); In re Marriage of Sjulin, 431 N.W.2d 773, 776 (Iowa 1988).

III. Discussion.
A. Did the district court err in awarding Blake physical careof Audery?

The district court, in deciding custody matters such as the placement of physical care, is directed to determine which parent will foster an “environment most likely to bring that child to healthy physical, mental and social maturity.” Heyer v. Peterson, 307 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 1981) (emphasis supplied). In making a determination of physical care for a minor child, the court must not only assess the parenting abilities of each parent relative to the other, but must also factor in all circumstances that contribute to the respective environments each parent is likely to foster. “Determining what custodial arrangement will best serve the long-range interest of a child frequently becomes a matter of choosing the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child’s growth and development.” In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 167 (Iowa 1973).

After comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties, we find neither parent possesses a clearly greater quantum of maturity or responsibility, nor of love and concern for Audery. We agree with, and therefore affirm, the district court’s determination that both Blake and Stephanie are fit parents entitled to joint legal custody of Audery. Both parents work full-time and therefore the responsibility for Audery’s care is often left to persons in each parent’s support network. To the district court and to us as well, the strength of the support networks becomes the determinative factor in this close case.[1]

The record is replete with references to the strength of Blake’s support network in Gilbertville. Significantly, both Blake’s mother and older sister have experience as professional child care providers. The record does not establish a comparable level of extended family support for Audery while in Stephanie’s care, and that, for us, tips the balance in favor of the district court’s placement of Audery’s physical care with Blake. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.

B. Does a joint physical care arrangement further serveAudery’s best interest?

Having found that placement of physical care of Audery with Blake is not contrary to the child’s best interest, we address Stephanie’s alternative argument that a joint physical care placement is in the child’s best interest. Prior to 1997, our case law stated joint physical care was strongly disfavored. See Brainard, 523 N.W.2d at 614. The basis for that presumption was found in the notion that equal physical care might be harmful because it could deprive children of a sense of stability. In re Marriage of Levsen, 510 N.W.2d 892, 894 (Iowa Ct.App. 1993).

The legislature disavowed the bias against joint physical care in 1997, finding the arrangement a viable solution where it advances the best interests of the child.[2] Iowa Code §598.41(5) (2003); In re Marriage of Walton, 577 N.W.2d 869, 870
(Iowa Ct.App. 1998). If the parents of the child are able to cooperate and respect each other’s parenting and lifestyles, a joint care arrangement can be successful. In re Marriage of Swenka, 576 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Because we find no evidence of such cooperation or mutual respect between the parties in this record, we conclude joint physical care would not be appropriate in this case. Accordingly, we adopt as our own the district court’s objective, well-reasoned, and thorough analysis of the best interests of Audery.

AFFIRMED.