No. 3-932 / 03-0108Court of Appeals of Iowa.
April 28, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Patrick J. Madden, Judge.
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Mark Cyr of The Law Office of Mark F. Cyr, P.C., Rock Island, Illinois, for appellant.
Craig Levien and Lisa Taylor of Betty, Neuman McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
VOGEL, P.J.
Ryan Gibbs appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Warehouse Raceway, L.L.C. Because Gibbs was bound by the signed release and waiver of liability, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Background Facts.
On December 2, 2000, Ryan Gibbs was injured when the rented go-kart he was driving caught on fire. On August 23, 2001, Gibbs filed a petition alleging negligence against the go-kart racetrack, Warehouse Raceway, L.L.C (Raceway). Raceway filed an answer on February 7, 2002, and later amended its answer to include the defense of waiver claiming Gibbs had signed a waiver releasing the racetrack from any and all liability. On October 22, 2002, based on the signed release and waiver, Raceway filed a motion for summary judgment, with supporting brief and statement of undisputed facts. With no resistance filed by Gibbs, the district court granted the motion on November 19, 2002.
Claiming he had not received notice of the motion for summary judgment, Gibbs filed a petition on December 2, 2002, to set aside the ruling and requested time to allow him to prepare a response to the motion for summary judgment. Raceway resisted, asserting proper service was made on Gibbs and the ruling should stand The district court declined to rule on the procedural question of whether Raceway properly served or Gibbs failed to receive the disputed motion, stating it had no reason to doubt the assertions made by counsel for either party. Rather, the district court considered the merits of the motion for summary judgment, weighing heavily in Raceway’s favor, and declined to set aside the order granting summary judgment. Gibbs appeals from this order.
Scope of Review.
Summary judgment rulings are reviewed for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4; General Car Truck Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Lane Waterman, 557 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa 1996). Where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is appropriate. Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3); City of West Branch v. Miller, 546 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 1996).
When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court reviews the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. City of West Branch, 546 N.W.2d at 600. Like the district court, we are restricted to consider only the evidence contained in the record when determining an appeal on a motion for summary judgment Bitner v. Ottumwa Cmty. Sch. Dist., 549 N.W.2d 295, 300 (Iowa 1996). All facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Bearshield v. John Morrell Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Iowa 1997).
Discussion.[1]
Gibbs argues there is a genuine issue of material fact and therefore summary judgment should have been denied. In his brief, Gibbs specifically claims that the circumstances surrounding the go-kart accident and subsequent injury were so unusual that the signed release and waiver would not apply. Raceway asserts that this argument was not included in the pleadings and record upon which the district court granted summary judgment and the ruling should stand The record does not indicate that Gibbs challenged the validity of the release before the district court; however, the district court did make a finding that go-kart racing was a purely recreational activity and found no reason to exempt this situation from the general rule of enforceability of releases.
Upon entering the Raceway facility and before renting a go-kart, Gibbs signed a `Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement.’ Paragraph four of the release states, Gibbs “[h]ereby assumes full responsibility for any risk of bodily injury, death or property damage arising out of or related to the event(s) whether caused by the negligence of releasees or otherwise.” Track owners and operators, such as Raceway, have a duty to provide safe premises Huber v. Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993) (citing Gibson v. Shelby County Fair Ass’n, 241 Iowa 1349, 1352, 44 N.W.2d 362, 364 (1950)). However, the Iowa Supreme Court has held that contracts exempting a party from its own negligence are enforceable and are not contrary to public policy. See id. at 56 (holding plaintiff was bound by the release absent proof the risk was unusual or exceptional); see, e.g., Bashford v. Slater, 250 Iowa 857, 865, 96 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1959) (injured racetrack flagman’s release enforceable). The Huber court discussed the applicable law when a release is involved,
[A signed release] is a contract, and its enforcement is governed by principles of contract law. Stetzel v. Dickenson, 174 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Iowa 1970). Construing a contract — determining its legal effect — is a matter of law to be resolved by the court. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1981).
When construing contracts, courts are guided by the cardinal principle that the parties’ intent controls, and except in cases of ambiguity, that intent is determined by what the contract itself says. Iowa R. App. P. [6.14(6)(n)].
Id. at 55-56.
There is no claim or indication in the record that the Raceway release was ambiguous, or in any way, invalid. Thus the release speaks for itself. Id. at 56. By signing the release Gibbs relieved Raceway of any and all liability whether the accident was a result of its negligence “or otherwise.” We agree with the district court that this activity was purely recreational and find no reason not to have the contractual waiver enforced as written. See generally id. at 55-56 (enforcing a release and waiver signed by a spectator at a racetrack). Gibbs was bound by the signed release, leaving no genuine issue of material fact asserted in this action. The district court correctly granted Raceway’s motion for summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.