HERNANDEZ v. WELLS DAIRY, INC., 705 N.W.2d 507 (Iowa App. 2005)

No. 05-0175Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed September 14, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.

Juan Hernandez appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. AFFIRMED.

Steven Hamilton of Hamilton Law Office, P.C., Storm Lake, for appellant.

Judith Ann Higgs and Lisa A. Peterson of Patterson, Plaza, Dykstra Prahl, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.

MAHAN, J.

I. Background Facts Proceedings

Jose Hernandez began working for Wells Dairy, Inc. in 1993, where he performed repetitive manual labor. Beginning in 1995, Hernandez complained of pain in his right shoulder, elbow, and wrist. Hernandez was subsequently diagnosed with epicondylitis, which is inflammation of the elbow, and right carpel tunnel syndrome, which is caused by an injury to the median nerve in the wrist. In 1999 Hernandez had surgery on his elbow and wrist. Medical tests did not show any problems with his shoulder, other than generalized pain. Hernandez was given work restrictions. In August 2001 he was discharged because Wells Dairy did not have any jobs compatible with his restrictions.

In March 2002 Hernandez filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits based on an injury to his “right wrist and elbow, back and shoulder possibly.” After a hearing, a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner concluded Hernandez’s impairment was confined to his arm, which is a scheduled member, and not his shoulder, which would entitle him to industrial disability benefits based on an injury to the body as a whole. The deputy determined Hernandez was entitled to benefits based on a two percent functional impairment to his arm.

On appeal, the workers’ compensation commissioner also found Hernandez’s injury was limited to his right arm. The commissioner noted, “[e]xtensive diagnostic testing failed to show any work-related abnormality located in claimant’s shoulder or elsewhere beyond the arm.” The commissioner concluded, however, that Hernandez was entitled to a ten percent disability rating for his arm. On judicial review, the district court found the commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Hernandez appeals.

II. Standard of Review

Our review is governed by the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. Iowa Code § 17A.20 (2003); Acuity Ins. v. Foreman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 216 (Iowa 2004). We review the district court’s decision by applying the standards of chapter 17A to the agency action to determine if our conclusions are the same as those reached by the district court. University of Iowa Hosps. Clinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).

III. Substantial Evidence

Hernandez claims the decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence. He claims he suffered an injury to his shoulder, which is an industrial disability, and not just to his arm, which is a scheduled member injury. He points out that his complaints to medical professionals included pain in his shoulder.

We may reverse, modify, or grant other relief if a party shows the agency’s actions is “[b]ased upon a determination of fact clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). “Substantial evidence” is defined as:

[T]he quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1); Clark v. Vicorp Rests., Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 603 (Iowa 2005). Factual findings regarding the award of benefits are within the commissioner’s discretion, and so we are bound by the commissioner’s findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 464-65 (Iowa 2004).

An injury to the arm is a scheduled member injury under section 85.34(2) (2001), and benefits are limited by the amount set in the schedule. See Second Injury Fund v. Nelson, 544 N.W.2d 258, 269 (Iowa 1995). An injury to a joint, such as a shoulder, however, is treated as an injury to the body as a whole, and is compensated as an industrial disability, taking into account the claimant’s earning capacity. Id.; Gilleland v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 524 N.W.2d 404, 407 (Iowa 1994). “Thus, the amount of compensation for an unscheduled injury is often much greater than for a scheduled injury.” Prewitt v. Firestone Tire Rubber Co., 564 N.W.2d 852, 854 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).

We find substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner’s finding that Hernandez suffered a work-related injury solely to the arm, and not the shoulder. As the commissioner found, “[e]xtensive diagnostic testing failed to show any work-related abnormality located in claimant’s shoulder or elsewhere beyond the arm.” Although Hernandez complained of pain in his shoulder, the evidence does not show any actual injury to his shoulder. Hernandez received treatment and surgery on his elbow and wrist, which did show signs of repetitive motion injury.

We affirm the decision of the district court and the workers’ compensation commissioner.

AFFIRMED.