No. 4-560 / 04-1029.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
August 26, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, William L. Thomas, Judge.
E.S. appeals from the termination of his parental rights to L.S. AFFIRMED.
Judith Amsler of Amsler Law Office, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Kelly Kaufman, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Hanna Weston of Nadler Weston, Cedar Rapids, for mother.
Melody Butz of Allen Vernon, P.L.C., Marion, for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
HUITINK, P.J.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Jackie and Evert are the parents of Liberty, born on April 19, 2002.[1] Evert was incarcerated on drug charges when Liberty was born. Liberty was removed from their custody at birth based on concerns for their history of substance abuse and domestic violence. Liberty was subsequently adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(n) (Supp. 2001) (a parent’s mental capacity or condition, imprisonment, or drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care).
The December 6, 2002, dispositional order continued Liberty’s placement in foster care. That order also required parental compliance in the court’s permanency plan and in-home parenting instruction.
Upon his release from incarceration, Evert moved in with Jackie. He enrolled in parenting classes and a batterers’ education program. Evert additionally completed a substance abuse evaluation and submitted to drug testing as part of his conditions of release. As a result, Evert’s parenting skills were notably improved.
Although Jackie also participated in services as required, she failed to improve her parenting skills as expected. Jackie continued to experience problems associated with depression and anger management. A social history report noted Jackie’s poor judgment and resulting risk of harm to Liberty. Despite these circumstances, Evert denied Jackie’s parental failures or that they presented any risk of harm to Liberty.
In August 2003 the State petitioned to terminate Evert’s and Jackie’s parental rights to Liberty. The juvenile court terminated Evert’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(h) (2003) (child is three or younger, child adjudicated a CINA, child removed from home for six of last twelve months, and child cannot be returned home). The court noted that while Evert’s parenting abilities were better than Jackie’s, he continued to deny Jackie’s parental failures and resulting danger. Jackie’s parental rights were also terminated on the same grounds. Evert’s 1.904(2) motion to amend or enlarge the juvenile court’s termination decision was denied. Evert appeals.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
On appeal Evert argues the State failed to establish all of the statutory elements of the grounds cited by the trial court for terminating his parental rights. He cites evidence of his improved parenting skills and his ability to adequately care for Liberty. He also argues his parental rights were terminated as a convenient incidental to termination of Jackie’s parental rights. We disagree.
Section 232.116(1)(h) provides for termination of parental rights if the child cannot be returned home as provided in section 232.102. Section 232.102 provides that a child may be returned home if the court finds the child will not suffer harm in a manner specified in section 232.2(6), defining a child in need of assistance. See Iowa Code § 232.102(9). Like the juvenile court, we find clear and convincing evidence indicating Liberty would likely be subject to injury and neglect if she returned to Evert’s care. More specifically, we find Evert’s refusal to acknowledge Jackie’s parental failures and resulting risk to Liberty are sufficient proof to establish this essential element of the grounds relied on for terminating Evert’s parental rights.
IV. Best Interests
Evert claims termination of his parental rights is not in Liberty’s best interests. Even if the statutory requirements for termination of parental rights are met, the decision to terminate must still be in the best interests of the child. In re M.S., 519 N.W.2d 398, 400 (Iowa 1994). In considering a child’s best interests, we look to the child’s long-range as well as immediate interests. In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172 (Iowa 1997).
We determine termination of Evert’s parental rights is in Liberty’s best interests. Liberty deserves permanency in her life and a chance for a stable and safe home. Evert is not able to provide Liberty with the safe environment that she needs.
V. Due Process
Evert asserts he was denied due process because the juvenile court relied upon information presented in an earlier termination involving another child of Jackie’s, in which he was not a party. This issue was not raised before the juvenile court, either during the hearing or in Evert’s rule 1.904(2) motion. An issue which has not been raised before the juvenile court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In re N.W.E., 564 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We conclude this issue has not been preserved for our review.
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court terminating Evert’s parental rights to Liberty.
AFFIRMED.