No. 5-153 / 05-0086.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
March 16, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Odell G. McGhee, II, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to one child. AFFIRMED.
Yvonne C. Naanep, Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Faye Jenkins, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
David Pargulski, Des Moines, for appellee-father.
Ed Bull of Bull Law Offices, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Angela appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter, Amanda, who was born in early January 2004. The order also terminated Amanda’s father’s parental rights, but he is not a party to this appeal. We affirm.
Amanda was removed from Angela’s physical custody five days after Amanda’s birth. Angela was nineteen years of age, had been placed in foster care in a child in need of assistance (CINA) proceeding from when she was twelve years of age until she became eighteen years of age, and had subsequently been living with her mother. Angela’s mother’s parental rights to Angela’s siblings had been terminated, and she was married to and living with a man who was a registered sex offender. Angela thus did not have adequate housing for herself and Amanda and acknowledged she could not provide for Amanda or adequately care for her. Amanda was placed in the legal custody of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), and has thereafter remained in DHS custody and family foster care placement.
Services have been provided to Angela beginning in late January 2004. Amanda was adjudicated a child in need of assistance in early March 2004 pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2003) (failure of parent to exercise reasonable degree of care in supervising child) and (6)(n) (parent’s mental capacity or condition results in child not receiving adequate care). Following a December 2004 hearing the juvenile court filed its order terminating Angela’s parental rights on January 12, 2005. The court terminated Angela’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (2005), (e), (h), and (i). Angela appeals.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
Angela does not claim that the State did not prove the grounds for termination under sections 232.116(1)(i). Further, she acknowledges that the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(h) were met. We therefore conclude the State has proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory grounds for termination under each of those two provisions. We need and do not address whether the State also proved one or more of the other two statutory grounds relied on by the juvenile court. See In re A.J., 553 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996).
Angela does claim, however, that “permanency should have been entered because [termination] was not in the best interests of the child.” More specifically, she argues that the evidence presented during the termination hearing shows Amanda has a bond with her and permanency rather than termination should have been ordered.[1] Angela’s argument implicates Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c), which provides that the court need not terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.
A strong parent-child bond is a special circumstance which militates against termination when statutory grounds have been satisfied. In re N.F., 579 N.W.2d 338, 341 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998). Yet it is not an overriding consideration, but merely a factor to consider. Id. Section 232.116(3) is permissive, not mandatory. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). It is within the sound discretion of the juvenile court, based upon the unique circumstances before it and the best interests of the child, whether to apply this section. Id.
The juvenile court recognized the existence of some bond between Amanda and Angela, finding that the bond “is described as good but cautious because of [Angela’s] mental issues.” It nevertheless found Amanda’s best interests would be served by termination of Angela’s parental rights. For the following reasons we agree.
Angela is of somewhat limited intellectual ability and is the product of a dysfunctional home. Although Amanda recognizes Angela and there is some bond between them, Angela is unable to recognize Amanda’s emotional needs and is incapable of “connecting” with her emotionally. Angela’s therapist, who had provided individual counseling for her for some six to seven months at the time of the termination hearing, best summarized Angela’s situation as follows:
There is no counseling, parenting classes or medical intervention that can prepare Angela for the responsibility of motherhood. She lacks the capacity to problem solve or care for the needs of anyone other than herself. Once Angela has internalized an experience it cannot change or be challenged. Unfortunately this robs her of the capacity to nurture or attune to another’s thoughts, needs and feelings.
Amanda’s pediatrician stated concerns that Angela is not capable of meeting Amanda’s daily cares, arranging childcare when working, or dealing with any acute illnesses Amanda might contract. Angela’s and Amanda’s service providers, the DHS case managers, and Amanda’s guardian ad litem, all recommended termination of Angela’s parental rights as being in Amanda’s best interests. Amanda is in a pre-adoptive foster home. She is integrated into and bonded with her foster family, which hopes to make her a permanent part of the family. Upon our de novo review we find the termination of Angela’s parental rights is in Amanda’s best interests and conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by giving greater weight to Amanda’s needs than to her “cautious” bond to Angela and thus not applying section 232.116(3)(c).
AFFIRMED.