No. 4-144 / 04-0093Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed March 10, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, William A. Price, District Associate Judge.
Mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Lisa Pendroy of Pendroy Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and Jon Anderson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Edward Bull of the Bull Law Office, P.C. Des Moines, for appellant-mother.
Karl Wolle, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for the child.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
VAITHESWARAN, J.
Alonzo Jr. (D.O.B. 7/26/02) was born with cocaine in his system. He was removed from his parents, Martina and Alonzo Sr., and placed with a maternal aunt. Eventually, the district court terminated both parents’ rights and this appeal followed.
Martina contends 1) the State did not meet its burden of proof under any of the provisions cited by the district court, and 2) termination is not in her son’s best interests. Alonzo Sr. raises the same challenges. Alonzo also argues trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that the State violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution by requiring supervised visits.
I. The Evidence.
We need only find clear and convincing evidence to support termination under one of the grounds cited by the district court See In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999). On our de novo review of the record, which includes transcripts from termination proceedings on several nonconsecutive dates, we conclude there is such evidence to establish that Alonzo Jr. cannot be returned to his parents. See Iowa Code §232.116(1)(h).
Martina admitted that she used crack cocaine during the pregnancy and in the month after her son’s birth. Although she was required to regularly provide urine samples to the Department of Human Services, she did not furnish thirty-three of the forty-seven ordered over a thirteen month period. Of the fourteen she provided, four tested positive for illegal substances. One sample, furnished just four months before the start of the termination hearing, tested positive for cocaine. While Martina voluntarily registered for several drug treatment programs, she left one prematurely, stating she did not like the art therapy portion of the program.
As for Alonzo Sr., Department personnel initially believed he also had a drug problem. However, all the urine samples he provided were drug-free, prompting the Department to discontinue testing. Department personnel nevertheless recommended termination of his parental rights based on his unstable living situation. One Department employee noted, “[he] can’t maintain employment. He has no source of income and they have bounced around from apartment to apartment because they cannot pay their rent consistently.”
We recognize that both parents did well with their son during twice-weekly supervised visits. A visitation supervisor testified that Martina was “very affectionate with Alonzo Jr.” and interacted “very well” with him. Another stated she was “really good” with him. Alonzo Sr. was similarly viewed as having appropriate parenting skills. However, both parents missed a number of visits and, during the termination proceedings, elected to cancel one of the weekly visits because they did not like the supervisor.
We also recognize that, shortly before the termination proceedings, both parents made efforts to increase the stability in their lives. Martina entered a highly structured drug treatment facility and Alonzo Sr. found an apartment and applied for disability benefits based on a rotator cuff injury he sustained in a bus accident.[1] However, we agree with the district court that these actions came too late. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h) (providing termination warranted if child removed for six consecutive months and other conditions are satisfied) In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 494-95 (Iowa 2000) (stating once limitation period lapses, termination must be viewed with sense of urgency). Martina had not spent enough time in the facility to evaluate her progress toward sobriety and Alonzo Sr. had not met Department expectations for consistency and stability. As one Department employee stated, “[m]y problem and my concern comes with the fact that they have not been consistent over the last year and a half. They have not been consistent in their employment, they have not been consistent in their housing and Martina has not maintained a drug-free life style over the last year and a half.”
We believe this evidence supports the district court’s termination of the parents’ rights to Alonzo Jr. under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h).
II. Best Interests
The parents also claim termination is not in Alonzo Jr.’s best interests. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 492. We disagree. The only home the child knew was that of his maternal aunt and the parents’ prospects for assuming his care in the near term were slim. Accordingly, we conclude termination was in Alonzo Jr.’s best interests.
III. Ineffective Assistance
Alonzo Sr. contends his first trial attorney was ineffective in failing to demand reunification services when the case plan was entered. He has not specified which services should have been demanded and what effect receipt of those services would have had on these proceedings. We accordingly find his claim too general to address. See Dunbar v. State, 515 N.W.2d 12, 15 (Iowa 1994).
IV. First Amendment Violation
Alonzo Sr. raises a First Amendment challenge that was not raised in the district court. Therefore, we will not consider it See State v. Lewis, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___ (Iowa 2004).
AFFIRMED.