No. 5-194 / 05-0055.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
March 31, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark D. Cleve, Judge.
S.P. and J.A. appeal from the termination of their parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Esther Dean, Muscatine, for appellant father.
Ronald Caldwell of Muscatine Legal Services, Muscatine, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Gary Allison, County Attorney, and Korie Shippee, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Neva Rettig-Baker of Baker Law Office, Muscatine, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
HUITINK, P.J.
I. Background Facts Proceedings.
Scott and Janice are the parents of the three children whose interests are at stake here: Jacob, born in 1994; Cole, born in 1997; and Makayla, born in 2000. Scott and Janice have a history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and criminal convictions. As a result, the family has received various services through the Department of Human Services (DHS) since 1997.
On May 31, 2002, the juvenile court entered a combined adjudicatory and dispositional order finding the children were children in need of assistance (CINA) under Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (Supp. 2001) (child is likely to suffer harm due to parent’s failure to supervise), (g) (parent fails to provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter), and (n) (parent’s drug abuse results in child not receiving adequate care). The court found, “The basis for the adjudication is the chronic inability or failure of the parents to provide appropriate care, supervision, and shelter due to parenting deficiencies and poor decision making and high-risk substance abusive lifestyle.” The children were placed in Janice’s care, subject to supervision by the DHS. Scott was prohibited from residing in the home or having unsupervised contact with the children.
In July 2002 the children were placed in foster care because of Scott’s continued contact with the children in violation of the dispositional order. The children were returned to Janice’s care in July 2002 after Scott’s probation was revoked and he was incarcerated. Janice was subsequently cited and punished for contempt of court because she took the children to visit Scott in prison. After his release from prison in early 2003, Scott returned to the family home. As a result, the children were removed and placed in foster care in June 2003. Although Scott was subsequently sent to a work release program for parole violations, the juvenile court denied Janice’s request for the children to be returned to her because “[t]he services that have been provided to the mother for many months have not been successful in causing her to protect her children as directed by the court.”
After Scott completed required substance abuse treatment in November 2003, the juvenile court granted him permission to visit the children. After a few visits, Scott failed to exercise his visitation rights and has had no contact with the children since December 2003. Janice’s visitation with the children and attendance at parenting classes similarly declined during that time period. Scott’s parole was revoked in February 2004, and he was returned to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence. Janice was thereafter hospitalized for treatment of a mental illness. Scott and Janice subsequently divorced but began living together again in September 2004.
II. Standard of Review.
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Scott and Janice claim the State failed in its burden to establish the foregoing grounds for termination of their parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. They argue the evidence indicates the children can safely be returned to their care. We disagree.
We have consistently cited past parental performance as a reliable indication of present and future capacity to care for children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). Here, Scott’s criminal behavior and recurrent incarcerations have deprived the children of essential parental care for substantial periods of time. Additionally, his failure to maximize opportunities to strengthen his relationship with the children or address past parental failures have increased rather than eliminated the risk of further adjudicatory harm. We, like the trial court, conclude the children cannot be safely returned to his care.
Although Janice has demonstrated greater interest in parenting, she has repeatedly subordinated the children’s interests in favor of her relationship with Scott. As a result, Janice has also failed to maximize her opportunities to address those issues necessitating the children’s adjudication and removal from her care. In addition to her failure to avail herself of needed services, we note Janice’s residential instability and consistent failure to keep the DHS informed of her address while juvenile court proceedings were pending. We affirm on this issue.
When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we need only find grounds to terminate under one of the sections cited by the juvenile court to affirm In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iwa Ct. App. 1999). We find the parents’ rights were properly terminated under section 232.116(1)(f) (2003). We, therefore, do not address the remaining issues raised on appeal. We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.
AFFIRMED.