No. 5-189 / 05-0183.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
March 31, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson, Judge.
A father appeals from a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to one child. AFFIRMED.
Jane M. White, Des Moines, for appellant-father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Michelle Chenoweth, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Nancy Pietz, Des Moines, for appellee-mother.
Rachel Seymour, Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Danielle is the mother, and Matt (also referred to at places in the record as “Matthew”) the father, of Gia, born in March 2003. Matt appeals from a January 2005 juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to Gia. The order also terminated Danielle’s parental rights, but her rights are not involved in this appeal. We affirm.
Gia was removed from Danielle’s physical custody in early September 2003. She has thereafter remained in the legal and physical custody of her maternal grandmother, at times subject to the supervision of the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS), except for a period of two to three weeks in June 2004 when she was briefly and unsuccessfully returned to Danielle. Gia was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) in October 2003.
The State filed a petition for termination of parental rights in early December 2004. Following a mid-January 2005 hearing the juvenile court terminated Matt’s parental rights to Gia pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) (2005), (e), and (h). Matt appeals.
We review termination proceedings de novo. Although we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when considering credibility of witnesses. The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best interests of the child. To support the termination of parental rights, the State must establish the grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116 by clear and convincing evidence.
In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (citations omitted).
Matt claims, as to each of the three statutory provisions relied on by the juvenile court, that the court erred in finding the requirements for termination were met. We first address section 232.116(1)(e). It provides that termination may occur when:
e. The court finds that all of the following have occurred:
(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(2) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for a period of at least six consecutive months.
(3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parents have not maintained significant and meaningful contact with child during the previous six consecutive months and have made no reasonable efforts to resume care of the child despite being given the opportunity to do so. For the purposes of this subparagraph, “significant and meaningful contact” includes but is not limited to the affirmative assumption by the parents of the duties encompassed by the role of being a parent. This affirmative duty, in addition to financial obligations, requires continued interest in the child, a genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, a genuine effort to maintain communication with the child, and requires that the parents establish and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
The first two elements of section 232.116(1)(e) were not disputed and were clearly proved by clear and convincing evidence. We therefore turn to the third element of that provision.
Matt apparently had no contact with Gia, and did not even know he was her father, until Gia was almost one year of age and recently-completed paternity testing revealed him to be her father. He then sought supervised visitations, and weekly visitations were established, to begin in March 2004. Matt was required to provide urine samples for drug testing (as he had a history of substance abuse), take parenting classes, cooperate with in-home services, and participate in supervised visitation.
During the more than ten months from early March 2004 through the mid-January 2005 termination of parental rights hearing over fifty appointments were made for Matt to provide urine samples for drug testing. He kept only one appointment, in May 2004. Matt failed or refused to participate in parenting classes. In addition, his lack of participation and lack of compliance with in-home services led to discontinuance of those services in August 2004.
Service providers had great difficulty getting Matt to schedule visits with Gia, and it took almost two months to schedule the first one after visits were established in March 2004. Thereafter Matt’s visits were sporadic and infrequent, as he would cancel scheduled visits or simply not show up or call. The service provider made efforts to contact Matt, but was unable to do so because his cell phone had been disconnected. After six weeks of being unable to reach him and having no contact from him she ceased efforts to provide visitation.
At a July 1, 2004 hearing in which Gia was removed from Danielle after being briefly returned to her, Matt stated an intent to request custody of Gia. In September 2004 he left two messages, representing he wanted to resume visits. However the case worker could not reach him after the first message because the telephone number he left was not a correct number. She could not reach him after the second message because he left no phone number or directions as to how to reach him. All efforts to reach him were unsuccessful.
On December 6, 2004, after the petition for termination of his parental rights had been filed, Matt made a request for visitation through his attorney. The DHS case worker told Matt’s attorney that Matt would need to provide urine samples for drug screens as scheduled and would need to contact the case worker to schedule visits. Matt did neither. As of the termination hearing Matt had not seen Gia in five and one-half months. He did not attend the termination hearing.
We find that in the six months before the termination hearing Matt demonstrated no real continued interest in Gia, made no genuine effort to complete the responsibilities prescribed in the case permanency plan, made no genuine effort to maintain communication with Gia, and neither established nor maintained a place of importance in Gia’s life. We thus find clear and convincing evidence he has not maintained significant and meaningful contact with her during the six months prior to the termination hearing. We also find he made no reasonable efforts to assume her care despite being given the opportunity to do so. We conclude the State proved the third element, as well as the first two elements, of section 232.116(1)(e) by clear and convincing evidence. Having found grounds to terminate under one of the sections relied on by the juvenile court, we need not address the other sections. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
Matt also claims the juvenile court erred in finding reasonable efforts had been made to prevent continued out-of-home placement of Gia. He alleges the record shows the DHS began termination efforts less than six months after initiating services for him. For two reasons we find no entitlement to relief on this claim.
First, Matt has not preserved error on this claim. While the State has an obligation to provide reasonable reunification services, the parent has an equal obligation to demand other, different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d at 65. Challenges to services should be made when the case plan is entered. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). When the parent alleging inadequate services fails to demand services other than those provided, the issue of whether services were adequate is not preserved for appellate review. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d at 65 In re T.J.O., 527 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). Nothing in the record indicates that Matt raised the issue of the reasonableness of services prior to the termination proceeding or that he at any time demanded additional or different services.
Second, the record in fact shows that Matt was offered services, including but not necessarily limited to in-home services, drug testing, and supervised visitation, in or before March 2004, some nine months before the termination petition was filed. He in fact participated in drug testing and supervised visitation in May 2004, some seven months before the termination was filed. His claim is thus not only unsupported by the record, but is in fact clearly and convincingly shown by the record to be false.
AFFIRMED.