No. 5-193 / 04-2059.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
March 31, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mary L. Timko, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children. AFFIRMED.
Molly Vakulskas Joly, Sioux City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas S. Mullin, County Attorney, and David Dawson, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Michelle M. Dreibelbis, Sioux City, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
SACKETT, C.J.
A mother appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her two children.[1] She contends the State failed to prove and the juvenile court did not order waiver of reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children. She also contends the State failed to prove either of the statutory grounds for termination cited by the court. On de novo review, we affirm.
Manuela is the mother of Javier, born in September 2002, and Maria, born in August 2004. From September 2002 to June 2004 the family was involved in the HOPES[2] program at the Crittenton Center in Sioux City because of domestic abuse and parenting issues. When Manuela was arrested on drug charges in June 2004, Javier was removed and placed in foster care. He was found to be in need of assistance in early August. Manuela was incarcerated when Maria was born in mid-August, and Maria was removed and placed in the same foster home as Javier. The court found Maria to be in need of assistance mid-October. Manuela was sentenced to fifteen years in prison on the drug charges. It is likely she will be deported after serving her sentence. She has been incarcerated during the pendency of this case. The only service the State provided her in this case was a psychosocial examination in September 2004. The State requested visitation and skill development services, but Manuela could not participate because of her incarceration.
In mid-October, the State petitioned to terminate the parents’ rights to Javier and Maria. In early December a combined dispositional/aggravated circumstances/termination hearing was held. The State offered the juvenile case files and Manuela’s sentencing order as exhibits. It presented no other evidence. Manuela’s attorney chose to stand silent. The guardian ad litem offered no evidence. The transcript of the hearing is three and one-half pages long.
In its written order the juvenile court found the allegations in the petition for termination of parental rights were supported by clear and convincing evidence. It found the foster family was willing to adopt both Javier and Maria, who were doing well, were integrated into the foster home, and were developmentally on target. The court further found termination of parental rights was in the best interest of both children so they could be adopted. The court did not make a finding that any of the aggravated circumstances existed to support waiving reasonable efforts. The court terminated Manuela’s parental rights under Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(d) and (i) (2003).
On appeal Manuela contends the court did not waive the reasonable efforts requirement, the State did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children, and the evidence does not support termination. The State contends Manuela did not preserve error on any of the issues raised.
Waiver of reasonable efforts.
Iowa Code section 232.102(12) provides that the juvenile court may waive the requirement for reasonable efforts if certain aggravated circumstances exist. In order to waive the requirement, the statute requires the court to make “written findings of fact based upon evidence in the record.” Iowa Code §232.102(12). The court made no such findings and did not expressly address the reasonable efforts requirement. The State contends Manuela did not preserve error because she did not file an Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion to have the court rule on the issue. We disagree. It was the State’s burden to prove aggravated circumstances exist that would support a waiver of the requirement it make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. If the State wanted the court to waive reasonable efforts, it was the State’s responsibility to bring the issue to the court’s attention. The juvenile court’s order did not relieve the State of its responsibility to make reasonable efforts to reunite Manuela with her children. We examine next whether or not the State fulfilled its responsibility.
Reasonable efforts.
Iowa Code section 232.102(10)(a) defines reasonable efforts as the efforts made to preserve and unify a family prior to the out-of-home placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal of the child or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home. If returning the child to the family’s home is not appropriate or not possible, reasonable efforts shall include the efforts made in a timely manner to finalize a permanency plan for the child. A child’s health and safety shall be the paramount concern in making reasonable efforts.
Most appeals from termination of parental rights, as the case before us, focus on the second aspect of the reasonable efforts requirement — efforts to return the child to the home. The State is required to “make every reasonable effort to return the child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.102(7); see also In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct.App. 1996). The reasonableness of the efforts is dependent on the unique circumstances of each case. In re S.J., 620 N.W.2d 522, 524-25
(Iowa Ct.App. 2000); In re E.K., 568 N.W.2d 829, 831
(Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
A parent’s incarceration does not relieve the State of its responsibility to make reasonable efforts, but it can affect what services are available or possible. S.J., 620 N.W.2d at 525. After Javier’s removal upon Manuela’s arrest on drug charges, the State planned for parent skill services and visitation. Manuela’s conviction and fifteen-year sentence, served more than halfway across the state made such services unreasonable. This brings us to the third aspect of reasonable services — timely finalization of permanency for the children. See Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a).
Javier was removed in early June 2004. Maria was removed at her birth in mid-August. They were placed together in a foster-to-adopt home. In October the State petitioned for termination of parental rights for all parents. There was no prospect of returning the children to Manuela’s care within any reasonable time. Both the putative and legal fathers were not available to care for the children. Permanency had to come through termination and adoption. The termination hearing and order were in December, only six months after Javier’s removal and less than four months after Maria’s removal. We find the State made reasonable efforts to provide permanency for these children in a timely manner.
Statutory grounds for termination.
Manuela contends, without any specifics, that the State did not prove either statutory ground for termination of her parental rights. When a juvenile court terminates a parent’s rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm if substantial evidence supports any one of the grounds cited by the court. In re S.R., 600 N.W.2d 63, 64 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
Manuela will be incarcerated for the next several years and may be deported after that. No legal or putative fathers are available to care for Javier and Maria. Unless removed by the State, the children would suffer neglect, having no one to care for them. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(i)(a). The neglect would constitute an imminent danger to the children. Id. at (i)(b). There is clear and convincing evidence services would not change the circumstances leading to the neglect (incarceration and deportation). Id. at (i)(c). We therefore find termination appropriate under section 232.116(1)(i).
AFFIRMED.