No. 4-444 / 03-1773.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed August 11, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, William L. Thomas, Judge.
John Greene appeals the denial of his petition to modify a divorce decree. AFFIRMED.
James Affeldt of Elderkin Pirnie, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Robert Leinen of Elwood Elwood Buchanan Leinen, Marengo, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
VAITHESWARAN, J.
John and Pamelia Greene divorced after seventeen years of marriage. John, a farmer, was ordered to pay $363.46 in child support for the parties’ two daughters. Each party was deemed responsible for “one-half of any uninsured medical/dental expenses for the children.”
In determining John’s child support obligation, the dissolution court found Pam earned $32,529 annually. As for John’s income, the court wrote, “[John] reports no income from farming on his financial affidavit.” The court continued, “It was very difficult to tell from the evidence what his actual income is or his cash flow might be.” The dissolution court adopted Pam’s estimate of John’s annual income for purposes of calculating child support. This amount was $16,000.
Approximately eighteen months after the decree was entered, John applied to modify his child support obligation. Pam counterclaimed. She sought attorney fees and an order requiring John to pay a portion of the children’s uninsured medical expenses.[1]
The district court denied John’s application to have his child support reduced but granted Pam’s request for reimbursement of $2,545.06 in uninsured medical expenses. The court also ordered John to pay Pam’s attorney fees of $1441.67. John moved for amended or enlarged findings and conclusions. The district court denied the motion and John appealed.
John contends the district court acted inequitably in (1) refusing to reduce his child support obligation, (2) ordering him to reimburse Pam for medical expenses, and 3) ordering him to pay Pam’s attorney fees. On our de novo review, we disagree with each of these contentions.
I. Child Support
A court may modify child support provisions when there has been a “substantial change” of circumstances. Iowa Code § 598.21(8) (2001); In re Marriage of Rietz, 585 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Iowa 1998). “[A] substantial change of circumstances exists when the court order for child support varies by ten percent or more from the amount which would be due pursuant to the most current child support guidelines. . . .” Iowa Code § 598.21(9).
John claims that his
“income has dropped from $16,000.00 from the date of the decree to an average of $6,848.00, a reduction of 57%, if his income is averaged over two years, or to an average of $4,053.00, a reduction of 75%, if his income is averaged over a three-year period.”
We believe John is comparing apples to oranges.
In the original decree, the district court imputed annual income to John of $16,000. This was essentially a determination that he had the capacity to earn $16,000, despite his reported lack of income from the farming operation. John did not appeal this determination.[2] Therefore, we begin with this $16,000 figure in assessing his modification application. John’s actual income from his farm operation is immaterial, as, by his own admission, it was zero at the time of the dissolution decree and increased after that date.
Focusing solely on John’s earning capacity, we agree with the district court that “John has simply failed to show that there has been any substantial change of circumstances since the decree was entered.” John admitted he had, in the past, “probably” earned between $20,000 and $30,000 a year at an off-the-farm-job. He presented no evidence that he could not secure a similar job following the district court’s entry of its dissolution decree. John also essentially admitted that he could earn rental income on the farm. Again, he presented no evidence that he attempted to do so but was unsuccessful. In short, John did not refute the dissolution court’s finding that he was capable of earning $16,000 annually, notwithstanding his negligible farm income. As there was no showing of substantially changed circumstances, we agree with the modification court that John is not entitled to a modification of his child support obligation.[3]
II. Medical Expenses
John next finds inequity in the district court’s order to reimburse Pam for $2,454.06 in uninsured medical expenses. We discern none. As noted, the dissolution court ordered each party to pay one-half of these expenses for each child. The modification court found that John had not paid his portion. This finding is supported by the record and is essentially undisputed. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order requiring John to reimburse Pam for his share of the children’s uninsured medical expenses.
III. Trial Attorney Fees
The district court ordered John to pay Pam’s attorney fees in the amount of $1441.67. John claims his “precarious” financial situation renders this award unreasonable. District courts have “considerable discretion in awarding attorney fees.” In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 99 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We find no abuse of that discretion. John’s financial situation at the time of the modification hearing was no more “precarious” than it was when the original decree was entered. Despite his low farm income, the modification court found he had significant farm assets and an earning capacity that exceeded his actual income. Accordingly, we affirm the award of trial attorney fees.
AFFIRMED.
(Iowa Ct.App. 1992). We reject this contention for two reasons. First, the modification court did not fix a figure for John’s earning capacity in light of its conclusion that there was no showing of substantially changed circumstances since the dissolution decree was entered. Second, the modification court in fact cited case law requiring written findings to support reliance on earning capacity and, in its ruling, made the following findings:
[John] has an earning capacity-on or off the farm-well in excess of his current income. He emphasizes that he has chosen to be a farmer and that he treats his work as a full time job. He is entitled to do that, but he is not entitled to make his children bear the cost of that choice.