No. 4-164 / 03-1085.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
June 9, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for DubuqueCounty, Alan L. Pearson, Judge.
Richard McKay appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his motion for an order nunc pro tunc, order discharging judgments, order for entry of partial satisfaction, and order to the clerk to issue a certificate of title for lack of jurisdiction. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Robert Sudmeier and Norman Wangberg of Fuerste, Carew, Coyle, Juergens Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant.
David Hammer, Angela Simon, and Scott Nelson of Hammer, Simon
Jensen, Dubuque, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
HECHT, J.
Richard McKay appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his motion for an order nunc pro tunc, order discharging judgments, order for entry of partial satisfaction, and order to the clerk to issue a certificate of title for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse and remand
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The district court entered a decree dissolving the marriage of Richard and Kathryn McKay on August 13, 2002. The decree awarded the marital home to Richard. Richard was also ordered to pay spousal support of $3500 per month to Kathryn until she reached age sixty-five.
On September 11, 2002, Richard filed a notice of appeal, appealing “each and every decision” of the district court and “from each and every adverse order, decision and ruling in this case which may have been made during the pendency of the action or trial of this matter.” Kathryn did not cross-appeal. In April 2003, Richard filed his proof brief with the supreme court claiming the district court’s award of alimony was inequitable.
On June 26, 2003, Richard filed a motion before the district court requesting a nunc pro tunc order, an order discharging judgments pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1016, an order for entry of partial satisfaction, and an order directing the clerk of court to issue a certificate of title. Specifically Richard asserted that he had made all payments required by the dissolution decree and was entitled to a satisfaction of judgment from Kathryn. Richard claimed he was attempting to sell the marital home awarded to him in the decree and could not provide clear title until Kathryn provided satisfaction for the sums owed to her by Richard in the dissolution decree. He also requested attorney fees. Kathryn responded that Richard’s pending appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction over Richard’s motions. Richard contended that because he had not appealed and Kathryn had not cross-appealed the decree’s division of property, the district court had jurisdiction to enforce its decree.
The district court concluded that despite Richard’s attorney’s professional statement that the only issue being appealed was spousal support, it did not have jurisdiction to order the satisfaction because it “assume[d] that all of the financial provisions of its decree adverse to [Richard] are being appealed.” The district court determined that Richard was attempting to comply with the provisions of the decree enabling him to dispose of a major asset while appealing those same provisions.
Richard appealed from this order, contending the district court erred in its conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction and in failing to require Kathryn to provide a partial satisfaction. Kathryn argues that Richard’s appeal is moot, and that if it is not moot, the district court properly held it did not have jurisdiction over the motion.
II. Standard of Review.
Our scope of review for actions tried in equity is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 4. However, the scope of review of rulings on subject matter jurisdiction is for correction of errors at law Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999).
III. Error Preservation/Mootness.
Kathryn contends Richard has not preserved error on this claim because he sold the marital home despite the district court’s ruling. She asserts the sale of the home renders this appeal moot. While Richard concedes he was able to sell the marital home without a satisfaction of judgment from Kathryn, he argues that to the extent the successful sale of the home creates an error preservation issue, the district court clearly addressed the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. In the alternative, he asserts that subject matter jurisdiction is not subject to traditional error preservation rules and may be raised at any time. Additionally he responds that this appeal is not moot because, although he sold the house, he suffered damages due to Kathryn’s refusal to provide satisfaction.
We conclude the issue of the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction is properly before us. Although Richard did eventually sell the house, we also conclude Richard’s appeal is not moot. Certainly one of the goals of Richard’s motions in the district court was to sell the house, but Richard also requested attorney fees and other damages for Kathryn’s allegedly wrongful withholding of satisfaction. A determination that this appeal is moot would leave Richard’s damage claim unaddressed. Accordingly, we conclude this appeal still presents a justiciable controversy and will address Richard’s claims. See In re M.T., 625 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Iowa 2001).
IV. Jurisdiction.
Because Richard’s notice of appeal asserted he was appealing from each and every decision of the district court, the district court assumed that all of the financial provisions of the decree were being appealed. The district court acknowledged it had the authority to enforce its judgments while on appeal, but concluded that the relief Richard requested went beyond the simple enforcement of the judgment. As a result, the district court concluded it did not have jurisdiction to offer the relief requested.
We disagree. A district court, absent a stay, retains the power to enforce its own judgments pending an appeal. Shedlock v. Polk County Dist. Ct., 534 N.W.2d 656, 658-59 (Iowa 1995). Richard’s attorney offered in the district court a professional statement that the only issue being appealed was the equity of the award of spousal support. Because neither party appealed the property division, Richard’s intent to sell the marital home upon the receipt of a partial satisfaction of judgment would have had no effect on the appeal. Additionally, whether or not Richard’s attempt to modify the alimony award on appeal was successful, a later modification of alimony would not affect the validity of the satisfaction sought by Richard in this case. There was no reason the district court could not enforce its judgment by ordering Kathryn to provide a satisfaction, if warranted, for payment of alimony and other financial obligations up to the date of the hearing. Accordingly, we conclude the district court erred in its determination that it did not have jurisdiction over the substance of Richard’s motions. We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.