No. 4-078 / 03-1084Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed March 24, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, Joel E. Swanson, Judge.
Russell Pietig appeals from the district court’s division of property in the decree dissolving his marriage to Susan Pietig.AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
Joseph Halbur, Carroll, for appellant.
Gregory Siemann of Green, Siemann Greteman, P.L.C., Carroll, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
HECHT, J.
Russell Pietig appeals from the district court’s division of property in the decree dissolving his marriage to Susan Pietig. We affirm as modified.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Russell and Susan Pietig married on June 7, 1986. About three months before the wedding, Russell contracted to purchase his parents’ eighty-acre farm for $96,000.00. He paid a total of $18,000.00 on the contract before the wedding. About three months after the wedding, Russell sold some livestock he had owned prior to the marriage and applied $45,000.00 of the proceeds to the real estate contract. In 1988, after the remaining balance on the contract was paid with the Pietigs’ marital assets, the farm, known as the Home Place, was deeded to Russell and Susan Pietig as joint tenants.
Russell farmed throughout the marriage. Susan worked outside the home as a cashier until their first child was born. Russell and Susan eventually had four children, and Susan stayed home with them, working inside the home and helping on the farm. When the children were older, Susan began working outside the home in the Kuemper Catholic School System where she was still employed at the time of the trial. From the beginning of their marriage, Russell and Susan considered the farming operation to be a partnership. Susan kept the books for the business, in addition to helping with barn chores, farrowing, selling hogs, and feeding Russell and the farmhands during harvests.
Russell filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 17, 2002. At the conclusion of the trial, the district court awarded Susan one-half of the appreciated value of the Home Place and ordered Russell to pay $5000.00 towards Susan’s attorney fees. Russell received $721,495.90 in the property division, including two farms, the farming equipment, and livestock. Susan was awarded $430,396.52 in property, including two farms. Russell was ordered to pay Susan $145,549.71 to equalize the property division. Russell appeals, contending the district court erred by awarding Susan half of the appreciated value of the Home Place and by failing to consider Russell’s $5000.00 obligation to Susan when it divided the property.
Standard of Review.
We review proceedings for dissolution of marriage de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We give weight to the findings of the district court, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
Home Place Appreciation.
Russell contends that because he paid $63,000.00 of the $96,000.00 purchase price with his pre-marital assets, he is entitled to sixty-five percent of the appreciation of the value of the Home Place. He argues the remaining thirty-five percent of the appreciation should be split evenly between Susan and him. The district court, however, gave Russell credit in the property division for the pre-marital assets he contributed to the purchase of the Home Place, but divided the total appreciated value evenly between Susan and Russell.
Our main concern when dividing property in a dissolution of marriage is determining what is fair and equitable in the circumstances of each case. In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 561 N.W.2d 94, 98 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). After our de novo review of the record, we conclude the district court’s division of the value of the Home Place was equitable. Russell was given credit in the property division for the $18,000 he paid on the real estate contract before the marriage. He was also given credit for the value of the livestock he brought to the marriage, even though he chose after the marriage to invest the proceeds from the sale of the livestock into the Home Place, a jointly-owned marital asset. Given these circumstances and based on our consideration of the factors prescribed in Iowa Code section 598.21(1) (2001), we conclude it was equitable to divide the value of the appreciation of the Home Place evenly between Russell and Susan, and we decline to modify the district court’s decision on this issue.
Attorney Fees.
Russell contends the district court erred, not by ordering him to pay $5000.00 toward Susan’s attorney fees, but rather by failing to give him a corresponding credit for that obligation in the division of marital assets. Susan testified that she had taken out a loan and used approximately $9,500 of the loan proceeds to pay her trial attorney fees. When calculating the division of property, the district court assigned that debt to Susan, reducing the net value of property Susan received and, in turn, increasing the amount of money Russell was obligated to pay Susan to equalize the division of property. After the equalization payment was thus calculated, the district court ordered Russell to pay $5000.00 towards Susan’s attorney fees.
Attorney fees at the trial level are not recoverable as a matter of right but rest within the trial court’s discretion and depend upon one spouse’s financial need and the other spouse’s ability to pay. In re Marriage of Dahl, 418 N.W.2d 358, 361
(Iowa Ct.App. 1987). Susan leaves the marriage with substantial assets. Because Susan’s loan debt incurred for the payment of her attorney fees was treated as a marital debt, the property division ordered by the district court effectively required Russell to contribute substantially to the payment of those fees. Accordingly, we modify the dissolution decree to eliminate Russell’s obligation to pay Susan an additional $5000.00 toward her trial attorney fees.
Appellate Attorney Fees.
Susan requests that Russell pay her appellate attorney fees. In determining whether to award attorney fees, we consider the needs of the party making the request, the ability of the other party to pay, and whether the party making the request was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal. In re Marriage of Cooper, 524 N.W.2d 204, 207 (Iowa Ct.App. 1994). After considering these factors, we conclude both parties shall be responsible for their own appellate attorney fees.
Costs of Appeal.
The costs of this appeal shall be divided equally between the parties.
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.