No. 5-174 / 04-1173.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
March 31, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, J. Hobart Darbyshire, Judge.
Appellant Angela M. Schroeder appeals, contending the district court should have sustained her application for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. AFFIRMED.
Angela Clingan, Davenport, appellant pro se.
Patrick Schroeder, Davenport, appellee pro se.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
SACKETT, C.J.
Appellant Angela M. Schroeder appeals, contending the district court should have sustained her application for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. After considering the limited record before us we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the district court and we affirm.
Angela filed an unverified petition for dissolution of marriage on September 9, 2003. She sought a dissolution and, among other things, an equitable division of property and spousal support. Appellee, Patrick A. Schroeder, filed a verified answer admitting the breakdown of the marriage and requesting, among other things, spousal support and an equitable division of the property. The parties both filed financial statements. Included on each financial statement was a nearly identical item under securities listed as “Pension, IL. State Painters.” The pension was shown as being owned by the husband and its market value and net value were both listed as unknown.
The decree of dissolution, according to the district court prepared by Angela who has appeared pro se throughout these proceedings, provided for the division of certain property but made no mention of the painters’ pension.
On June 15, 2004, Angela filed an application for “entry of her Qualified Domestic Relations Order.” Other than asking for a hearing and further relief as the court deems equitable the application provided no other information. The matter came on for hearing. Angela appeared and Patrick appeared with his attorney. The court found after hearing the evidence and arguments that:
In the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage filed April 16, 2004, there is no mention of any division of any type of retirement account, pension or the like. Petitioner [Angela] drafted the Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, and her use of the terms “all other property of the parties” in paragraph 6, page 2 of said Decree is insufficient to transfer or divide any property except those mentioned in said paragraph 6 on page 2 of said decree.
Angela contends that paragraph six of the decree which provides, “The petitioner is awarded all furniture, household items, and all other property of the parties except the respondent’s cloths and personal care items,” supports her position that she should have a Qualified Domestic Relations Order. (Emphasis added).
This is an equity action, our review is de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. We have a duty to examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented. In re Marriage of Steenhoek, 305 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1981). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
The resolution of the issues raised in this appeal requires an interpretation of the decree dissolving the marriage. In re Marriage of Ruter, 564 N.W.2d 849, 851 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). The decree is interpreted and enforced as a final judgment of the court. See Prochelo v. Prochelo, 346 N.W.2d 527, 530 (Iowa 1984). The determining factor guiding our inquiry is the intent of the court as gathered from the decree and other proper evidence. In re Marriage of Knott, 331 N.W.2d 135, 137 (Iowa 1983) (citing Bowman v. Bennett, 250 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Iowa 1977)). Extrinsic evidence may be considered “not to show the language means something different than what is said in the [decree] involved, but to show what is meant by what is said.”Peters v. Peters, 214 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Iowa 1974). We are required to give effect to “that which is both expressed and implied.” Bowman, 250 N.W.2d at 50. We also seek to give effect to the language of the entire decree in accordance with its commonly accepted and ordinary meaning. Gendler Stone Products Co. v. Laub, 179 N.W.2d 628, 630 (Iowa 1970).
Angela correctly points out that paragraph six contains the language: “Petitioner is awarded . . . all other property of the parties except. . . .”[1] We recognize, as she argues, that pensions are property. The district court is directed to make an equitable division of the parties’ property. See Iowa Code §598.21(1) (2003). The word property, for the purposes of section 598.21(1), “includes personal and real property.” Iowa Code §4.1(24). Similarly, “the words personal property include money, goods, chattels, evidences of debt, and things in action.” Iowa Code § 4.1(21). Pension benefits represent a contractual right to future payment, and are a chose in action and are, by the above definition, personal property. See In re Marriage of Bevers, 326 N.W.2d 896, 900 (Iowa 1982); Gunsaulis v. Tingler, 218 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1974). While we might assume that Angela seeks the order with reference to the painters’ pension, the papers she filed do not tell us as much although she does appear to argue in her brief that it is this item for which she seeks the order. We assume that to be the case.[2]
The items specified in paragraph six, on which she relies, are furniture, household items, clothing, and personal care items such as would be found in one’s home. This could indicate an intention that paragraph six was only meant to divide property in the household. The language Angela relies on in paragraph six is also contradicted by the two following paragraphs, numbers seven and eight, which award Patrick property including all right to Schroeder Construction and Remodeling, Inc., and a 2004 Ford F250. The district court also took evidence which is not available to us.
Angela has failed to show that the district court incorrectly interpreted paragraph six of the decree.
AFFIRMED.