No. 5-490 / 05-0824Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, Jane Mylrea, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals from the order terminating her parental rights to a son. AFFIRMED.
Kimberly Lange, Edgewood, for appellant.
Thomas Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, John Bernau, County Attorney, and William D. Werger, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
David Baumgartner, Strawberry Point, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
HECHT, J.
Amber is the mother of Spencer, who was born in March of 2004. Spencer was removed from Amber’s custody in July of 2004, due to concerns about inappropriate supervision; allowing a sexual abuser access to Spencer; minimal provision of food, clothing, and shelter; and Amber’s mental health issues. In September, Spencer was adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA), pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b), (c)(2), (d), (g) and (n) (2003). After Amber failed to actively pursue reunification services or visitation, the State filed a petition seeking to terminate her parental rights. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated her rights under sections 232.116(1)(e) and (h). Amber appeals.
We review termination orders de novo. In re R.F., 471 N.W.2d 821, 824 (Iowa 1991). Our primary concern in termination proceedings is the best interests of the children. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000). While the district court terminated the parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we will affirm if at least one ground has been proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276
(Iowa Ct.App. 1995). The grounds for termination must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000).
On appeal, Amber maintains clear and convincing evidence does not support the termination on either of the grounds cited by the juvenile court.[1] Upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude the court properly terminated Amber’s rights under section 232.116(1)(h), which requires clear and convincing proof that Spencer is three or younger, has been adjudicated CINA, has been removed from his mother’s care for six months, and cannot be returned to her custody.
The primary concern that initially prompted Spencer’s removal from Amber’s care was her neglect and inappropriate supervision of Spencer. These concerns do not appear to have been remediated, despite the efforts of Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) caseworkers and other service providers. While Amber initially was consistent with visitations and other services, that participation was short-lived. By the time of the termination hearing, Amber had not visited Spencer for ten weeks, had ceased all services, and refused contact with DHS. In fact, she had not attempted to contact Spencer on his first birthday. At trial, Amber explained her failure to remain active in visitations was because she was busy, sick, and had a personality conflict with the visitation supervisor. Clearly, Spencer was not a priority in Amber’s life in at least the two months preceding the termination hearing. Without more effort on Amber’s behalf, it is not possible to conclude the circumstances that led to Spencer’s removal have been alleviated, such that he could be returned to her custody. In addition, Amber’s unstable life is not consistent with providing a safe and nurturing environment for a child. During the pendency of this case, she did not work and lived in more than ten residences, usually with a male partner. We therefore affirm the termination of her parental rights.
AFFIRMED.