No. 2-411 / 02-0469.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed May 15, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, DANIEL L. BLOCK, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two minor children. AFFIRMED.
Dawn D. Newcomb of Newcomb Law Office, Waterloo, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tabitha Gardner, Assistant Attorney General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Steven Halbach, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee-State.
Patricia Lough, Vinton, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by VOGEL, P.J., and MAHAN and EISENHAUER, JJ.
EISENHAUER, J.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her two minor children. She contends the district court erred in terminating her rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f) (Supp. 2001).[1] We review her claims de novo. SeeIn re M.T., 613 N.W.2d 690, 691 (Iowa Ct. App. 2000).
In order to terminate parental rights under section 232.116(1)(f), the State is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children are four years of age or older, have been adjudicated in need of assistance, and have been removed from the home for twelve of the last eighteen months. The mother does not dispute the State has met this burden. However, she contends it did not prove the fourth element of section 232.116(1)(f), that the children cannot be returned to her as provided in section 232.102. We disagree.
The children are five and six years old and have been involved in the court system for nearly all of their lives. The mother has an extensive criminal history, resulting in extended and frequent absences from her children’s lives. The district court stated:
Because of [the mother’s] lengthy criminal history, transient lifestyle, substance abuse and mental illness, including diagnoses of bipolar, conduct disorder, depression, and personality disorder, the State believes the children cannot be returned to the mother’s care. The court must concur.
The future can be gleaned by the mother’s past performance. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Iowa 2000). Based on our de novo review of the record, we find the State has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the children cannot be returned to their mother’s care. As a result, the district court properly terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to section 232.116(1)(f). Because grounds for termination need only be proven under one section, we need not consider whether termination was proper under section 232.116(1)(g). See In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
The mother also argues the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children. She contends that once her children were placed in pre-adoptive foster care, the State ceased to provide her services and did not allow her the opportunity to resume care of her children. The reasonable efforts requirement is not a strict substantive requirement for termination. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). Instead, the services and the scope of the efforts provided by the Department of Human Services to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the State’s burden of proving the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent. Id. Despite the services offered to her, the mother failed to make the changes in her life necessary to enable her to parent her children. While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. Id. at 494. Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. Id. At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Accordingly, we find no error.
AFFIRMED.