Categories: Iowa Court Opinions

IN THE INTEREST OF F.G., 02-1771 (Iowa App. 6-13-2003)

IN THE INTEREST OF F.G., Minor Child, S.G., Mother, Appellant.

No. 3-337 / 02-1771Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed June 13, 2003

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Nancy A. Baumgartner, District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals a juvenile court permanency order maintaining the placement of her daughter outside the family home. AFFIRMED.

Thomas O’Flaherty of O’Flaherty Law Firm, Swisher, for appellant-mother.

Stephen Jackson, of Jackson Jackson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for father.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Bruce Kempkes, Assistant Attorney General, Harold Denton, County Attorney, and Rebecca Belcher, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Charles Nadler of Nadler Weston, Cedar Rapids, for minor child.

Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Miller and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

VAITHESWARAN, J.

Sherry is the mother of Falon, born in 1987. Falon was removed from Sherry’s care in late 2000 based on her mother’s homelessness. She was placed in shelter care for several months until a suitable foster home could be located. Her mother exercised periodic visitation with her while she was in shelter care and regular weekend supervised visitation after Falon was transferred to a foster home. Mother and child maintained a close, loving relationship.

In early 2002, the juvenile court afforded Sherry an additional six months to move toward reunification, subject to fulfillment of certain expectations. At the end of this period, the Department of Human Services recommended placement of Falon in long-term foster care or in an independent living setting rather than in her mother’s home. The juvenile court adopted this recommendation after finding Sherry had “not made sufficient progress so that Falon could safely be returned to her care.” Sherry appeals this ruling, contending she met Department expectations for reunification on at least a trial basis.

On our de novo review of the record, we agree Sherry made significant progress towards meeting Department expectations. She obtained an apartment in Cedar Rapids, maintained it appropriately, found a job, continued treatment for mental health issues, and did not interfere with Falon’s significant progress in school.

Sherry did not, however, demonstrate financial and emotional independence. At the time of the permanency hearing, she was living in the same apartment complex as her former husband, whom she had accused of raping her. She conceded he helped her pay her bills and she expressed an unwillingness to sever ties with him notwithstanding his past treatment of her. Additionally, she continued to maintain close, regular contact with her oldest adult son until shortly before the permanency hearing, despite evidence he sexually abused Falon as a child. Although she stated she moved to Cedar Rapids to avoid this son, the record reflects she saw him just a week before the permanency hearing.

A child protective worker cited Sherry’s continued interaction with her abusive former husband and her oldest son as specific risks to Falon if she were returned to her mother. The worker also opined that Sherry was not “stable enough to meet Falon’s day-to-day basic needs long term.” A family therapist who supervised visits between Sherry and Falon essentially seconded this opinion, although she admitted she lacked specific knowledge of the family’s situation at the time of the permanency hearing.

We recognize, as the juvenile court did, that Sherry and Falon share a close bond warranting deferral of a termination of parental rights proceeding. We also acknowledge that Falon as well as her guardian ad litem expressed a desire for reunification. Nevertheless, we believe it is not in Falon’s best interests to have her returned to Sherry, even on a trial basis. See In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d 243, 248 (Iowa 1998). At the time of her removal, Falon suffered from emotional and behavioral problems. By the time of the permanency hearing, Falon was thriving in her placement and was performing well at school. For these reasons, we concur with the juvenile court’s permanency order.

AFFIRMED.

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