No. 3-069 / 02-1983Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed February 12, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Nancy Baumgartner, District Associate Judge.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their children. AFFIRMED.
Raymond Lough, Vinton, forappellant mother.
John Hedgecoth, Cedar Rapids, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, and Timothy McMeen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Eric Tindal, Williamsburg, guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Considered by Vogel, P. J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
EISENHAUER, J.
A mother and father appeal the termination of their parental rights to their children. The mother contends the juvenile court erred in denying her requests for a psychological examination, a trial home placement, and a ninety-day continuance. She also claims the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be returned to her care. The father contends the State failed to prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. We review their claims de novo. See In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2002).
The district court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (Supp. 2001). Section 232.116(1)(h) provides for termination of parental rights if:
(1) The child is three years of age or younger.
(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days.
(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.
The mother argues the last element of the section has not been met. We disagree.
On de novo review, we conclude clear and convincing evidence shows the children cannot be returned to their mother. These twin girls were born prematurely on May 22, 2001. They were removed from their mother’s custody on September 12, 2001. The mother and girls had been living in deplorable conditions. They returned to mother’s care on October 17, 2001 and were again removed on December 12, 2001. They remain in foster care.
Despite mother’s participation in services, she has exhibited an inability to care for the children for longer periods of time. Her failure to understand her children’s development has placed them in danger, as she has left them unattended in booster seats and the bathtub. She does not understand her workers’ concerns with exposing premature babies to filthy living conditions. Nor does she comprehend that it is inappropriate to have a relationship with a teenage boy. She demonstrated no understanding of the needs of her young children. The trial court found and we agree: “This is a case of a mother who simply lacks the ability to consistently provide her children with the stability, nurturing, structure, and protection necessary to protect them from neglect.” Even the mother’s own expert witness recommended termination.
The mother contends the court erred in denying her request for a follow up psychological evaluation, and that this denial constitutes a failure on the part of the State to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The reasonable efforts requirement is not a strict substantive requirement for termination. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000). Instead, the services provided by DHS to reunify parent and child after removal impacts the State’s burden of proving the child cannot be safely returned to the care of a parent. Id. As we have already determined, the children cannot be safely returned to the mother. A follow up psychological evaluation would not have corrected the deficiencies in her parenting abilities.
The mother lastly contends the district court erred in denying her a ninety-day continuance to allow for a trial home placement. However, the mother had already had one failed trial home placement and circumstances had not changed since the last removal, nearly one year earlier. Even the mother’s own expert did not believe more time would bring additional changes. While the law requires a “full measure of patience with troubled parents who attempt to remedy a lack of parenting skills,” this patience has been built into the statutory scheme of chapter 232. In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 494. Children should not be forced to endlessly await the maturity of a natural parent. Id. At some point, the rights and needs of the child rise above the rights and needs of the parent. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). We find no error.
Finally, the father contends the district court erred in terminating his parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.116(1)(b), (d), and (h). While the district court terminated parental rights on more than one ground, we need only find one ground to affirm. In re R.R.K., 544 N.W.2d 274, 276 (Iowa Ct.App. 1995). Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b) provides for termination when clear and convincing evidence supports that the child has been abandoned or deserted. Here, the father has not participated in services or complied with any requirement of his case permanency plan. He only visited his children once since they were adjudicated in need of assistance and has not provided them with support. On de novo review, we conclude the father has clearly abandoned his children.
AFFIRMED.