No. 4-390 / 03-0836Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed August 17, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory A. Hulse, Judge.
Roger Sporleder appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review of a workers’ compensation award. AFFIRMED.
Steven C. Jayne, Des Moines, for appellant.
William H. Grell of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe Lanz, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, Zimmer, Hecht, and Eisenhauer, JJ, but decided by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel, Zimmer, Hecht, and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
HECHT, J.
Roger Sporleder appeals from the district court’s ruling on judicial review of a workers’ compensation award. We affirm.
I. Factual and Procedural Background.
After graduating from high school, Sporleder, his wife, and their children operated a substantial farming business. They raised grain and livestock on more than 3000 acres in Iowa and Texas. While farming, Sporleder also operated a trucking business and a hog-buying station.
Sporleder has a long and somewhat complicated medical history. He injured his back and underwent successful back surgery in the early ’70’s. He suffered other injuries in the mid-’70’s and mid-’80’s which further injured his back, damaged internal organs, and produced “dumping syndrome” from which he suffers intermittent bouts of diarrhea and constipation.
After his farming and trucking enterprises failed in 1987, Sporleder began driving trucks for Crouse Cartage Company (Crouse) in 1987. Sporleder thereafter filed three workers’ compensation petitions claiming injuries sustained in the course and scope of his employment with Crouse on January 8, 1997 (fall resulting in lumbar spine injury), January 13, 1999 (fall causing back injury and depression), and December 20, 1999 (cumulative injury to both upper extremities). A hearing was held on October 8, 2001 and an arbitration decision was filed by the presiding deputy workers’ compensation commissioner on November 26, 2001. The deputy found Sporleder sustained a five percent industrial disability as a result of the 1997 injury. The deputy also found Sporleder was permanently totally disabled as a result of the January 13, 1999 injury to his back, both upper extremities, and resulting depression. Because the deputy reasoned that the cumulative injury to Sporleder’s upper extremities became manifest on January 13, he found Sporleder sustained no compensable injury on December 20, 1999.
Sporleder appealed the arbitration decision, contending the deputy erred in rejecting his claim of a December 20, 1999 cumulative injury. The interim workers’ compensation commissioner affirmed the arbitration decision in an appeal decision filed July 31, 2002. The appeal decision acknowledged the record “also contains support for” a finding of December 20, 1999 as Sporleder’s bilateral upper extremity injury date. However, the commissioner concluded the doctrine of apportionment dictated that the defendants’ liability “would be no different regardless of which date of injury in 1999 is applied to the [upper extremity] injury.” The commissioner reasoned that because Sporleder was totally disabled as a consequence of the January 13, 1999 injury, he could not be entitled to further compensation as a consequence of the alleged December 20, 1999 injury.
Sporleder sought judicial review of the agency’s decision. The district court affirmed the agency’s decision, and Sporleder now appeals contending the agency made an error of law when it determined the cumulative injury to both upper extremities manifested on January 13, 1999. In particular, he contends as a matter of law, the cumulative injury to his upper extremities was not manifest until December 20, 1999 when he was first unable to work because of problems with his upper extremities. Sporleder further contends the agency’s determination of the date of the injury to his upper extremities was unreasonable and unsupported by substantial evidence. He also claims the agency erred in concluding Iowa Code section 85.36(9)(2001) — the “apportionment statute” — precludes an award of compensation for the alleged December 20, 1999 injury to his upper extremities.
II. Scope and Standard of Review.
Our review of a decision of the workers’ compensation commissioner is for correction of errors of law. Second Injury Fund of Iowa v. Shank, 516 N.W.2d 808, 812 (Iowa 1994). In determining whether the district court erred in exercising its power of judicial review, we apply the standards of Iowa Code section 17A.19(10) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court Williamson v. Wellman Fansteel, 595 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 1999); E.N.T. Assocs. v. Collentine, 525 N.W.2d 827, 829 (Iowa 1994). As to the agency’s factual determinations, the court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action if it determines substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is [b]ased upon a determination of fact, clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f) Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463-65 (Iowa 2004).
“Substantial evidence” is defined as “the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1).
“When [the] record is viewed as a whole” in section 17A.19(10)(f) means “that the adequacy of the evidence in the record before the court to support a particular finding of fact must be judged in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in the record cited by any party that supports it . . .” Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(3).
The commissioner’s decision does not lack substantial evidentiary support merely because inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from the same evidence. Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997). The ultimate question is not whether the evidence supports a different finding, but whether it supports the findings the commissioner actually made. Id.
“Because factual determinations in workers’ compensation cases are `clearly vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency,’ it follows that application of the law to those facts is likewise `vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.'” Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 465 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)). “An agency’s application of the law to the facts can only be reversed if we determine such an application was `irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.'” Id.
(quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m)). This “`irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable’ standard” gives “appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.” Id. (quoting Iowa Code §17A.19(11)(c)).
The agency’s decision regarding apportionment of disability benefits is based upon statutory interpretation. Id. at 464. Our supreme court has concluded the legislature did not delegate “any special powers to the agency regarding statutory interpretation in [this area].” Id. Thus, such interpretation “has not `clearly been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency.'” Id. (quoting Iowa Code §17A.19(10)(c)). “We therefore need not give the agency any deference regarding its interpretation and are free to substitute our judgment de novo for the agency’s interpretation.” Id.
III. Discussion.
A. Agency’s determination of date of cumulative upperextremity injury.
Sporleder re-injured his back in the course and scope of his employment with Crouse in January of 1997.[1] During the course of medical treatment for that injury, Dr. Selden Spencer reported in May of 1997 that Sporleder had experienced bilateral hand pain and numbness for several years. Dr. Spencer’s report noted the carpal tunnel symptoms had become progressively worse during the previous six months, and “may derive from the demands of [Sporleder’s] work.” Dr. Spencer further noted in 1997 that Sporleder “would probably be better served with [carpal tunnel] surgery.” Sporleder did not have carpal tunnel surgery at that time, however, and he returned to work as a truck driver for Crouse on May 12, 1997. The record discloses no further medical treatment for, and no missed work as a consequence of, the carpal tunnel condition from May of 1997 until Sporleder was again injured while working for Crouse in January of 1999.
On January 13, 1999, Sporleder fell while dismounting from a semi-tractor and injured his head, elbow, and back. He testified his bilateral hand condition was also worse after this injury.[2] His testimony in this regard is confirmed by a medical record disclosing that on January 15, 1999, Sporleder reported ongoing problems of pain and swelling in his hands. He was again advised to have carpal tunnel surgery, but initially chose the more conservative option of wearing splints. Although the record evidences some short-term improvement from conservative treatment modalities, Sporleder’s carpal tunnel symptoms persisted through the remainder of 1999.
Because Sporleder’s carpal tunnel symptoms persisted, he underwent left carpal tunnel surgery on December 28, 1999, and right carpal tunnel surgery on February 8, 2000. These surgeries left Sporleder with a permanent functional impairment of twenty percent on the right side and nineteen percent on the left side, and resulted in the imposition of restrictions on grasping, gripping, pinching, squeezing, and torquing motions. Moreover, Sporleder is permanently restricted from repetitively using his hands, and should not use vibratory equipment.
The agency was asked to determine when Sporleder’s cumulative upper extremity injury occurred. Crouse claimed the injury manifested in 1997 when medical treatment was provided for the condition and surgery was recommended. Sporleder claimed the injury did not occur until December of 1999 when he had surgery and was unable to work. The date of cumulative injury is the date when “disability manifests itself.” Oscar Mayer Foods Corp. v. Tasler, 483 N.W.2d 824, 829 (Iowa 1992). “`Manifestation’ is best characterized as `the date on which both the fact of the injury and the causal relationship of the injury to the claimant’s employment would have become plainly apparent to a reasonable person.'” Id., (quoting Bellwood Nursing Home v. Industrial Comm’n, 505 N.E.2d 1026, 1029 (1987)). The agency has substantial latitude in choosing the date of manifestation which involves “an inherently fact-based determination.” Tasler, 483 N.W.2d at 829. Because repetitive-trauma injuries often take years to become compensable, the agency is not required to fix the date on injury on the date when the claimant first became aware of a health problem or sought medical treatment. Id. at 829-30. Rather, the agency may consider “a multitude of factors such as absence from work because of inability to perform, the point at which medical care is received, or others, none of which is necessarily dispositive. Id. at 830.
As we have already noted, Sporleder had a long history of carpal tunnel symptoms prior to the fall on January 13, 1999. As early as 1997, a specialist recommended surgery and opined that Sporleder’s condition “may be derived from the demands of his work.” Sporleder’s own testimony established that the carpal tunnel symptoms worsened significantly after the January 1999 incident. Although he did not undergo carpal tunnel surgery until after he reached maximum medical improvement following his September 1999 back surgery, this fact is not dispositive in identifying the date of cumulative injury. Given Sporleder’s testimony and his long history of carpal tunnel problems, a reasonable fact-finder could find on this record that the carpal tunnel surgeries would have occurred much earlier if the more urgent low back surgery had not been performed first. Based on the foregoing, we conclude the agency’s finding that Sporleder’s carpel tunnel cumulative injury occurred on January 13, 1999, is supported by substantial record evidence.
B. Agency’s permanent total disability determination.
Sporleder concedes he was severely disabled as a consequence of the January 13, 1999 injury. However, he disputes the agency’s determination that he was permanently totally disabled as a consequence of that injury; and he claims he did not become totally disabled until (1) his bilateral carpal tunnel injury became manifest on December 20, 1999, and (2) the disability from that injury combined with the disability resulting from his other physical injuries and his depression.
We have already determined above that substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding of January 13, 1999 as the carpal tunnel cumulative injury date. However, even if we were to accept Sporleder’s argument that his carpal tunnel injury did not manifest until after January 13, 1999, we conclude his claim must fail. After carefully reviewing the record and the factors the agency must consider when making disability determinations under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(u), St. Luke’s Hosp. v. Gray, 604 N.W.2d 646, 653 (Iowa 2000), we conclude the agency’s finding of permanent total disability is supported by substantial evidence even without consideration of the disability resulting from Sporleder’s carpal tunnel injury. Substantial medical evidence establishes that the January 1999 low-back injury significantly increased the low-back impairment resulting from his two previous low-back injuries and left him with very substantial physical restrictions.[3] Moreover, the significant physical impairment resulting from the January 1999 injury was also a substantial factor leading to Sporleder’s depression.
Given (1) Sporleder’s significant physical impairment resulting from multiple work-related low-back injuries and surgeries, (2) his depression produced at least in substantial part from his January 1999 back injury and resulting disability, (3) his educational background, his age, and other relevant factors, we conclude the agency’s finding of permanent total disability would be affirmed even without consideration of any disability resulting from the carpal tunnel injury. Accordingly, we reject Sporleder’s contention that the agency erred in finding him totally disabled as a consequence of the January 13, 1999 injury.
C. Agency’s application of 85.36(9)(c).
In its appeal decision, the agency concluded that even if Sporleder had sustained a cumulative injury on December 20, 1999, he would not have been entitled to additional disability benefits because the benefits from the two injuries would be apportioned See Mycogen, 686 N.W.2d at 465. However, we need not reach this issue because the agency’s decision that Sporleder did not sustain a compensable injury on December 20, 1999 is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
Having reviewed the record in its entirety, we find all issues raised by Sporleder on appeal are without merit. The final agency action is hereby affirmed.
AFFIRMED.