No. 4-328 / 03-1847.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
June 23, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles L. Smith, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court decision to enforce an easement agreement concerning a roadway abutting the parties’ property. AFFIRMED.
Anthony Tauke of Porter, Tauke Ebke, Council Bluffs, for appellants.
Deborah Petersen of Reilly, Petersen, Hannan Dreismeier, P.L.C., Council Bluffs, for appellees.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
MAHAN, P.J.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
In 1969 David and Juanita Peterson, Kenneth and Nancye Andersen, and Buddy and Joan Vosler entered into a written easement agreement to build a road which abutted each of their properties in rural Pottawattamie County. The agreement provided, “each of the Parties, their heirs and assigns, shall have a perpetual right of ingress and egress through, upon, and across the above described road.” At the time of the agreement, the Petersons and Andersens intended to develop a subdivision on the property. Therefore, a provision was added to the agreement that provided for a supplemental and more detailed road agreement, if needed. However, this future development by the Petersons and Andersens never came to fruition. Thus, the original easement was never supplemented.
In 1976 Raymond and Georgia Starr purchased the Andersens’ property. The Voslers’ property also obtained new owners. In 1997 the Petersons sold their home on the west side of the road to Thomas and Leslie Wood, but retained their farmland, which abutted the road on the east. The Petersons also transferred a portion of their property, which did not abut the road, to their daughter and son-in-law, Debra and Fred Hill.
All of the parties whose land adjoined the road used the road for ingress and egress. The Petersons rented out some farmland, and their tenant also used the road to access the farmland The Hills did not use the road for normal ingress and egress. The Petersons, however, gave the Hills permission to use the road to build a garage on their property, and trucks came over the road for a period of a few days.
In May 2002 the Starrs filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunction, claiming the agreement provided only for use of the road by residents, and that the road was not intended to be used for access to farmland or by people whose lots did not abut the road. The Petersons counterclaimed, seeking clarification of the respective property owners’ responsibilities for maintenance costs.
The district court stated:
The Court finds that the Agreement quite clearly addresses the issue of ingress and egress for all of the parties and the property as a whole. There is no restriction in the agreement on the use of all of the parties of the roadway in question. One of the parties, defendant Peterson, is the owner of Parcel “E.” They cannot now be denied the access that the agreement says they have and which they have exercised for some twenty years.
The court developed a formula for assessing costs for maintenance of the road. The Starrs appeal.
II. Standard of Review
This case was tried in equity, and our review is de novo. See
Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. In equity cases, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, the court gives weight to the fact findings of the district court, but is not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g).
III. Easement Agreement
The Starrs contend the district court improperly determined the original intent of the parties, as shown by the language of the easement agreement. The Starrs claim the road was intended to be used only by the three parties who resided next to the road. They claim the Petersons should not be permitted to use the road for farm equipment absent a supplemental agreement, and that the Petersons should not be able to use the road at all because they sold their home to the Woods.
In construing an easement, the intent of the grantor, as evidenced by the entire instrument, is controlling. Flynn v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipeline Co., 161 N.W.2d 56, 64-65 (Iowa 1968). We may apply general contract principles to ascertain the grantor’s intent. Hawk v. Rice, 325 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1982). If the easement agreement is ambiguous, the manner in which the parties themselves have construed the agreement is persuasive evidence of their intention. Wiegmann v. Baier, 203 N.W.2d 204, 208 (Iowa 1972).
The district court concluded the easement agreement was unambiguous. The court determined the agreement clearly addressed “the issue of ingress and egress for all of the parties and property as a whole.” We agree that the agreement clearly gave the parties to the agreement, and their assignees, “a perpetual right of ingress and egress through, upon, and across the above described road.” The Petersons were parties to the original agreement, they still own property which abuts the road, and we conclude they may use the road for ingress and egress from their property. The fact that they sold a portion of their property to the Woods does not change their rights under the agreement. The Petersons’ use includes the use of the road by their farm tenant. In addition, the parties’ rights to further negotiate and enter into a supplemental agreement still exist and are not affected by the district court decision.
We determine the district court did not rewrite the parties’ easement agreement, but instead properly interpreted the agreement. We note that the parties have agreed the road is not for regular use by parties who do not own land adjoining or abutting the road. We affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.