No. 4-446 / 03-1907.Court of Appeals of Iowa.
July 28, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lucas County, Richard D. Morr, Judge.
Defendants challenge the district court’s ruling ordering them to pay room and board costs at the Lucas County Jail. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellants.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, and Paul Goldsmith, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
VOGEL, P.J.
Appellant-prisoners collectively challenge Iowa’s statutory scheme under Iowa Code section 356.7 (2003) which vests discretion in local sheriffs to set daily room and board costs at the county jails and to determine from which inmates the county chooses to seek reimbursement of such costs. As we find nothing in this procedure as applied to appellants-prisoners which violates the separation of powers, or offends either equal protection or due process, we affirm.
Background Facts.
Appellants Michael Abrahamson, Chad Krutsinger, Sonny Oxford, James Stier, and Fred Willett (“the Prisoners”) were inmates at the Lucas County Jail for varying time periods in spring 2003.[1] After their convictions and release or transfer to other facilities, the Lucas County Sheriff, Delbert Longley, filed separate applications for restitution and reimbursement seeking to recover from the Prisoners the costs of room and board and medical expenses for their separate periods of incarceration at the county jail. Attorney for the Prisoners filed a consolidated resistance and brief alleging numerous grounds upon which to deny the specific restitution claims for each prisoner. After a hearing, the district court determined the amount sought by the sheriff was “necessary, fair and reasonable” and ordered the Prisoners to reimburse the Lucas County sheriff for the amount of expenses as individually calculated. The Prisoners appeal the order for reimbursement of room and board costs only.
Scope of Review.
Our review of constitutional challenges to a statute is de novo. State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa 2002) (citations omitted). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional and a challenger must prove the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Santi v. Santi, 633, N.W.2d 312, 316 (Iowa 2001); State v. Keene, 629 N.W.2d 360, 364 (Iowa 2001). Moreover, “the challenger must refute every reasonable basis upon which the statute could be found to be constitutional.” Keene, 629 N.W.2d at 364. If the statute is capable of being construed in more than one manner, one of which is constitutional, we must adopt that construction. Santi, 633 N.W.2d at 316.
Discussion.
Iowa Code section 910.2 (2003) provides that,
In all criminal cases in which there is a plea of guilty, verdict of guilty, or special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction is rendered, the sentencing court shall order that restitution be made by each offender . . ., to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to pay, for . . . court costs including correctional fees approved pursuant to section 356.7. . . .
(Emphasis added). Iowa Code section 356.7(1) provides:
The county sheriff may charge a prisoner who is eighteen years of age or older and who has been convicted of a criminal offense or sentenced for contempt of court for violation of a domestic abuse order for the room and board provided to the prisoner while in the custody of the county sheriff.
Section 356.7 further provides:
Upon receipt of a claim for room and board reimbursement, the court shall approve the claim in favor of the sheriff or the county for the amount owed by the prisoner as identified in the claim. . . .
Id. If the offender is not reasonably able to pay the costs the court may order the offender to perform a public service. Id.
The Prisoners claim the above statutory scheme violates the separation of powers under the Iowa Constitution, as well as equal protection and due process guarantees under the United States and Iowa constitutions. We will discuss each claimed violation in turn.
Separation of Powers.
The Prisoners claim Iowa Code section 356.7 is an unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the county sheriff contrary to Article III, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. Specifically, the Prisoners claim that the statute gives the sheriff unlimited discretion in whether to seek reimbursement for room and board from county jail inmates and what amount to charge. The State contends that an improper delegation of legislative power has not been shown beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Iowa Constitution provides:
The powers of the government of Iowa shall be divided into three separate departments — the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial: and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any function appertaining to either of the others, except in cases hereinafter expressly directed or permitted.
Iowa Const. art. III, § 1.
Our supreme court discussed this delegation of legislative power in In re C.S., 516 N.W.2d 851, 859 (Iowa 1994), Legislative power is the power to make, alter, and repeal laws and to formulate legislative policy. Frost v. State, 172 N.W.2d 575, 583-84 (Iowa 1969). Executive power is the power to put the laws enacted by the legislature into effect. 16 Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 303, at 818 (1979). Based on this division of responsibility, legislative delegations of power to an executive body have historically required a clear delineation of legislative policy and substantive standards to guide the agency in its implementation of that policy. See Zilm v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 260 Iowa 787, 793-94, 150 N.W.2d 606, 610 (1967).
The more modern view adopted by our court is that precise substantive guidelines or standards are not required in the legislation if adequate procedural safeguards are provided. Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Bd., 330 N.W.2d 267, 273-74 (Iowa 1983); Board of Supervisors v. Department of Rev., 263 N.W.2d 227, 238 (Iowa 1978). The procedural safeguards must advance the legislature’s purpose and must preclude arbitrary, capricious, or illegal conduct by the agency. Polk County, 330 N.W.2d at 274.
Our Supreme Court in C.S. considered whether the juvenile court had authority to order placement of a mentally ill child in need of assistance in an out-of-state facility when certain statutory and administrative provisions restricted funding available for such a placement. C.S., 576 N.W.2d at 854. The court found that the challenged statutes did not provide for procedural safeguards to protect against an arbitrary decision because the statutes did not give the party opposing the action the right to argue its position nor did the statutes provide for a review process. Id.
While it is true Iowa Code section 356.7 appears to give unlimited discretion to county sheriffs to set and charge per diems, followed with a mandate that the district court “shall approve” the amount requested, our analysis does not end with reading that statute in isolation. See State v. Brown, 376 N.W.2d 910, 912 (Iowa Ct.App. 1985). Rather, we turn to Iowa Code chapter 910, which provides the mechanism for setting and reviewing “correctional fees,” specifically referring to section 356.7 as part of a larger restitution plan. See Iowa Code § 910.2. Iowa Code section 910.2 gives the district court discretion in formulating a restitution plan in that it “shall order . . . to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to pay, . . . court costs including correctional fees approved pursuant to section 356.7, . . . .” It further provides that to the extent the prisoner is unable to pay such costs, the prisoner may, as an alternative to cash payment, perform community service work. Id. Moreover, section 910.7 provides a prisoner at any time during incarceration, probation, or parole the opportunity to seek modification of the restitution plan. Id. Upon such request, the district court shall grant the prisoner a hearing if on the face of the petition it appears that a hearing on modification is warranted. Id. By reading sections 356.7 and 910.2 in pari materia, we find sufficient safeguards in place which preclude the arbitrary, capricious, or illegal conduct of the sheriff in implementing section 356.7. As to each of these prisoners, the district court included in its order:
If the Defendant claims that he is not reasonably able to pay all or part of the court costs, including the correctional fees approved pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 356.7, the Defendant can request that the matter be set for hearing upon his inability to pay.
Under these facts, as well as built into the statutory scheme, there are sufficient procedural safeguards in place which protect against a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Standing.
While the Prisoners challenge the constitutionality of section 356.7
facially and as applied, they do not discuss how the two challenges differ. The State claims that the Prisoners lack standing to raise a facial challenge to the statute because it is not unconstitutional as applied to these particular Prisoners.
A defendant has standing to claim that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him but does not necessarily have standing to make a facial challenge, that is, that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to others. State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 2002) (citing State v. Hunter, 550 N.W.2d 460, 463 (Iowa 1996), overruled on other grounds by State v. Robinson, 618 N.W.2d 306 (Iowa 2000); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 839 (1973)). A closely-related principle is that constitutional rights are personal in nature and may not be asserted vicariously. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610, 93 S. Ct. at 2915, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 839. We have recognized exceptions to the rule that a defendant lacks standing to make facial challenges to a statute, however none apply here. See id. at 611, 93 S. Ct. at 2915, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 839 (noting exceptions where individuals not parties to a particular suit stand to lose by its outcome and have no effective avenue of preserving their rights themselves and an exception in the area of the First Amendment).
Because we find, as set forth below, that the statute is constitutional as applied to these Prisoners, we will not specifically address the Prisoners’ facial challenge.
Equal Protection.
The Prisoners next assert that they were treated differently from other prisoners incarcerated in other counties around the state who are subject to lower per diem room and board claims. They claim no rational basis has been established for the varying treatment. The State agrees that the statute allows sheriffs to assess correctional costs at different rates across the state and determine who to charge and the amount of such charge but such disparate treatment does not rise to the level of an equal protection violation.
Equal protection under the United States and Iowa Constitutions guarantees that all people will be treated similarly in similar circumstances and conditions. State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Iowa 1985) (citing Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904, 907 (Iowa 1973), overruled on other grounds by Miller v. Boone County Hosp., 394, N.W.2d 779 (Iowa 1986)). However, equal protection permits a state to pass laws applicable to persons within a class if such classification is reasonable and not arbitrary. Id. Equal protection is not denied because in practice some inequality exists. Id. “[T]he classification will be upheld if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived to justify it.” Lunday, 213 N.W.2d at 907.
All parties agree that the legislature’s purpose in allowing reimbursement from prisoners for room and board costs are to alleviate budget strain and to instill a sense of responsibility in the prisoners. See State v. Jackson, 601 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999); Haines, 360 N.W.2d at 795. As there are no guidelines or per diem rates set forth under Iowa Code section 356.7, the charges may vary from county to county. Sheriff Longley testified he believed Clarke County charged $60 and Marshall County charged between $65 and $70 per day for room and board. The record is devoid of current rates charged by other counties in Iowa and there is no evidence that any of these Prisoners were charged a greater per diem than other Lucas County prisoners. Nor is there evidence of the sheriff seeking reimbursement from some Lucas County prisoners but not others. Sheriff Longley sought and these Prisoners were each ordered to pay $50 per day for the costs of room and board during their incarceration at the Lucas County Jail. The $50 per diem was established in Lucas County by Sheriff Longley in light of the county’s budget for the jail and upon the advice of the Iowa State Sheriffs and Deputies Association and the South Iowa Area Crime Commission. The figure takes into account operational costs of the jail, transportation, clothing and toiletries, and food.
We recognize, as well as glean from the sparse record, that jail operating costs may well vary from county to county as the jails vary in capacity, structure, and personnel. Under the rational-basis standard, a statute “enjoys a presumption of constitutionality which can only be overcome by proof that the law is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.” State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Iowa 1997). In light of the testimony presented, we agree with the district court, that the charges made for Lucas County were fair and reasonable. We therefore find no equal protection violation under Iowa Code section 356.7 as applied to these Prisoners.
Due Process.
The Prisoners’ final claim is that because the local sheriff retains unbridled discretion in implementing Iowa Code section 356.7, they were not given effective notice of the possible consequences of their criminal conduct thereby asserting a violation of their due process guarantees under the United States and Iowa Constitutions.
To withstand a due process challenge, a penal statute must define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and provide an adequate standard for those who administer the law. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 352, 357, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 909 (1983) (citations omitted); State v. Todd, 468 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa 1991); State v. Wagner, 410 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Iowa 1987).
Iowa Code section 356.7 clearly provides fair notice for the possibility of seeking reimbursement from prisoners for the costs of room and board as a consequence of committing a crime. Specific to these Prisoners, Debbie Dyer, the administrative assistant to Sheriff Longley, testified that the cost for room and board in Lucas County is posted in the booking area of the jail and is also included in the jail rules and regulations provided to each prisoner. In addition, the Prisoners received a hearing on the reasonableness, fairness, and necessity of these charges even though not statutorily required.
The statute also provides an adequate standard for the sheriff to administer the law. Section 356.7 specifically allows a sheriff to charge prisoners for their room and board while assigned to the county jail. See generally State v. Walker, 506 N.W.2d 430, 432 (Iowa 1993) (“To the degree a statute gives sufficient notice to an accused, it also necessarily gives law enforcement personnel and courts the same standards for its application.”). As stated above, Sheriff Longley properly considered the jail’s budget and suggestions from the Iowa State Sheriffs and Deputies Association and the South Iowa Area Crime Commission in determining the amount of room and board to charge prisoners. Further, the statute provides guidance for the sheriff, stating that the sheriff may seek reimbursement from any “prisoner who is eighteen years of age or older and who has been convicted of a criminal offense or sentenced for contempt of court for violation of a domestic abuse order.” Iowa Code §356.7(1). The Prisoners meet this classification. We therefore find that the Lucas County sheriff in setting and requesting reimbursement for room and board, did not deprive these prisoners of due process as he provided both notice to these Prisoners and was equipped with an adequate standard by which to implement Iowa Code section 356.7. We affirm the district court’s order for reimbursement.
AFFIRMED.