STATE v. BENDIXEN, 705 N.W.2d 107 (Iowa App. 2005)

No. 5-392 / 04-1191Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed July 13, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt, District Associate Judge.

Thomas Bendixen appeals from his conviction for possession of marijuana. AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen Doland, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Robert DiBlasi, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.

HECHT, J.

Thomas Bendixen appeals from his conviction for possession of marijuana. We affirm.

Background Facts and Proceedings.
At around 1:15 a.m. on the morning of April 2, 2004, Des Moines police officer Christopher Wellman received a dispatch indicating a possible prowler in the 500 block of Southeast Thornton Street. Officer Wellman and another officer proceeded to the area and observed a vehicle stopped at a stop sign at the intersection of South Union and Thornton Street, which was located approximately five blocks from the location noted in the dispatch. According to Wellman, the vehicle did not proceed through the intersection, but rather remained stationary at the stop sign for approximately twenty seconds. At this time, Wellman activated his emergency lights and positioned his patrol car in front of the vehicle.

As Wellman exited his patrol car, he observed the driver of the vehicle, later identified as Thomas Bendixen, bending over in the driver’s seat with his hands off the steering wheel. Upon reaching the car, Wellman discovered that Bendixen’s pants and underwear were down around his knees. When Bendixen exited the vehicle, Wellman immediately noticed a plastic wrapper containing marijuana in the vehicle.

Based on this incident, the State charged Bendixen with possession of marijuana, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5) (2003). Bendixen’s subsequent motion to suppress was denied by the district court. Following a bench trial, the court found Bendixen guilty as charged and sentenced him to 180 days incarceration, but suspended the jail sentence. Bendixen appeals, contending the court erred in failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the illegal stop, and subsequent search, of his vehicle.

Scope of Review.
In assessing an alleged violation of a constitutional right, we review de novo the totality of the circumstances as shown by the entire record. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 2000). We are not bound by the district court’s determinations, but we may give deference to its credibility findings. State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).

Motion to Suppress.
The district court determined the officer’s actions were valid on two grounds. In particular, it found (1) the officer “had specific articulable information to support his stop for investigatory purposes” and (2) the officer “had a valid reason to investigate further based on the community caretaking exception.” On appeal, Bendixen contests both of these conclusions.

An officer may stop an individual or vehicle for investigatory purposes based on a reasonable suspicion that a criminal act has occurred or is occurring. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968). The purpose of an investigatory stop is to allow a police officer to confirm or dispel suspicions of criminal activity through reasonable questioning. United States v. Hickman, 523 F.2d 323, 327 (9th Cir. 1975). To justify an investigatory stop, the officer must be able to point to “specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 906. In determining the reasonableness of the particular search or seizure, the court judges the facts against an objective standard: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?” Id. The circumstances under which the officer acted must be viewed “through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.” United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

We conclude the facts support the district court’s conclusion Wellman acted reasonably when conducting an investigatory stop of Bendixen’s vehicle. Here, Officer Wellman was alerted to a possible prowler in the early morning hours of the day in question. At a time during which there was no other traffic on the road in that vicinity, Wellman observed Bendixen’s vehicle stopped at a stop sign, just a few blocks from the scene of the reported prowl. When the vehicle did not proceed through the intersection for approximately twenty seconds, Wellman’s suspicions became understandably aroused. Wellman testified that based on his training and experience, the typical driver only stops at a stop sign for approximately three seconds before proceeding.

The report of a possible prowler within reasonable temporal and geographic proximity to the location of the stop, the time of day, and Bendixen’s unusual driving, cumulatively gave rise in this case to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity had just occurred or was occurring. See State v. Otto, 566 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1997). The intrusion imposed on Bendixen was thus warranted as an investigatory stop. The district court properly denied the motion to suppress, and we therefore affirm the convictions.

AFFIRMED.