No. 04-1340Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed September 14, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, C.H. Pelton and Mark D. Cleve, Judges.
Anthony Brown appeals from his conviction and sentence for second-degree murder, contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel on his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary E. Tabor, Assistant Attorney General, William E. Davis, County Attorney, and Jerald Feuerbach, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Linda Del Gallo, Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Miller, JJ.
SACKETT, C.J.
The defendant-appellant, Anthony Brown, appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction, following a stipulated trial on the minutes, to second-degree murder. He contends defense counsel was ineffective in not arguing the defendant’s statements made to police after promises of leniency should be suppressed.
Background facts and proceedings.
The defendant was taken into police custody and interrogated following the disappearance of his paramour. During the interrogation, the detectives repeatedly told the defendant it was not a crime if he was defending himself or if he just panicked. He eventually told them he hit her twice with a brick and he “just snapped.” One detective told the defendant that snapping was not a crime.
The State charged the defendant with first-degree murder and willful injury. The defendant filed a notice of the defense of diminished responsibility. He later filed a motion to suppress all statements made during his interrogation. The motion noted that the defendant had taken several Prozac tablets en route to the police station and appeared obviously impaired, including falling asleep, during the interrogation. The defendant argued his statements were not voluntary because he was incapable of waiving his Miranda rights due to his drugged state. The district court denied the motion, finding the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination.
Following the adverse ruling on his motion to suppress and after reaching an agreement with the State to amend the trial information to one count of second-degree murder, the defendant agreed to a bench trial on a stipulated record. The district court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him to up to fifty years in prison.
Scope and standards of review.
We review claims counsel provided ineffective assistance de novo. State v. Oetken, 613 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 2000). A defendant must demonstrate that counsel failed in an essential duty and prejudice resulted. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 142 (Iowa 2001). Failure to prove either element of the claim is fatal to the claim. See State v. Pierson, 554 N.W.2d 555, 562
(Iowa Ct.App. 1996). To prove prejudice, a defendant must show that counsel’s failure worked to the defendant’s actual and substantial disadvantage so that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Buck, 510 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Iowa 1994). Ordinarily such claims are preserved for postconviction proceedings to give defense counsel an opportunity to respond to the defendant’s claims State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa 2002). We may resolve the claim on direct appeal, however, when the record adequately presents the issue. See State v. Martinez, 679 N.W.2d 620, 625-26 (Iowa 2004).
Analysis.
On appeal, the defendant contends defense counsel was ineffective in not also arguing in his motion to suppress that the statements made after promises of leniency were involuntary. He observes the motion was made under an alternative theory — that he was under the influence of drugs during the interrogation. He claims “[c]ounsel’s failure to recognize the involuntariness claim based on promissory leniency was a breach of an essential duty.” He argues he was prejudiced by being forced into a bench trial on a stipulated record, which prevented him from presenting an effective defense.
From our de novo review of the record, we find the defendant has failed to establish prejudice. Although he claims he was forced to agree to a trial on the minutes of testimony, the record reveals the choice to submit the case on a stipulated record (not just the minutes of testimony of the State’s case) was after negotiations to amend the trial information from first-degree murder and willful injury to second-degree murder. The State agreed not to include the detective’s report that contained the questionable statements by the defendant. The stipulated record contained the evaluation of Dr. Murphy for the defense that opined the defendant was unable to form specific criminal intent because of his mental condition. The court conducted a discussion on the record both with the defendant and defense counsel on the decision to waive a jury trial. Based on its review of the record, the statements of the defendant, and the statements of defense counsel, the court found the waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made. We find no reason to disagree. We also find no reasonable probability the outcome of this case would have been different for the defendant had he insisted on going to trial, even if his statements to detectives had been suppressed. See State v. Tracy, 482 N.W.2d 675, 680
(Iowa 1992). Without a showing of prejudice, the defendant cannot demonstrate counsel was ineffective. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.