STATE v. HARRINGTON, 699 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa App. 2005)

STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WENDELL CARL HARRINGTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 5-290 / 04-1237Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed May 11, 2005

[EDITOR’S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom, Judge.

Harrington appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion for order nunc pro tunc. AFFIRMED.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan Japuntich, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Robert Ewald and William A. Hill, Assistant Attorneys General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and George Karnas, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

VAITHESWARAN, J.

Wendell Harrington discharged his sentences for two crimes but did not discharge his 1994 restitution obligations associated with those crimes. When he was later re-incarcerated for a new offense, the Department of Corrections began withholding money from his inmate account to satisfy the old restitution orders. Harrington applied to enjoin this practice, styling his application a “motion for order nunc pro tunc.” Relying on Iowa Code sections 904.702 and 910.7A (2003), the district court denied the motion. Our review of the court’s ruling is for errors of law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4.

Section 910.7A(1) states that an order requiring an offender to pay restitution “constitutes a judgment and lien against all property of a liable defendant. . . .” Section 904.702 authorizes the Department to deduct payments from an inmate’s account for restitution and to deduct “an amount sufficient to pay all or part of any judgment against the inmate. . . .”

We agree with the State that the old restitution orders were “judgments” under section 910.7A(1). We also agree that these judgments “survived [Harrington’s] discharge and brief period of freedom.” See Iowa Code § 614.1(6) (authorizing actions on judgments within twenty years). Finally, it is clear that, on Harrington’s recommitment to prison, section 904.702 authorized the Department to satisfy the judgments by deducting payments from Harrington’s inmate account. Cf. State v. Chase, 415 N.W.2d 493 (Iowa 1990) (holding otherwise in opinion predating enactment of section 910.7A).

We conclude the court did not err in denying Harrington’s motion.

AFFIRMED.

jdjungle