No. 5-356 / 04-1188Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed July 13, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Peter B. Newell, Judge.
Lavern Hoeper appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
David R. Johnson of Brinton, Bordwell Johnson, Clarion, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Kasey E. Wadding, County Attorney, and Bryan Barker, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
MILLER, J.
Lavern Frederick Hoeper appeals from his conviction for operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code sections 321J.2(1)(a) and (b) and 321J.(2)(2)(a) (2003). He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss, because his right to a speedy trial was violated. Hoeper also contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying Hoper’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reverse and remand for dismissal.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Shortly after midnight on November 22, 2003, Bremer County Deputy Sheriff Shane Hoff stopped Hoeper’s vehicle after observing it traveling seventy miles per hour in a fifty-five mile per hour speed zone. As Deputy Hoff stopped Hoeper, he did not suspect Hoeper was operating the vehicle while intoxicated. However, after field sobriety tests and administration of a preliminary breath screening test Deputy Hoff arrested Hoeper for operating while intoxicated.
The State filed a trial information on December 8, 2003, charging Hoeper with operating while intoxicated. Hoeper filed a written arraignment on December 24, 2003, in which he demanded speedy trial. The district court scheduled a pre-trial conference for February 2, 2004, and scheduled trial for February 12, 2004. On January 14, 2004, Hoeper filed a motion for disclosure of evidence and discretionary discovery. The court set a hearing on the motion for February 9, 2004. At the February 2 pre-trial conference the court set trial for March 11, 2004. Depositions were taken on February 5, 2004, and on February 9, 2004 Hoeper filed a motion to suppress certain evidence. On February 11, 2004, the court scheduled a hearing on the motion to suppress for March 17, 2004. The court denied Hoeper’s motion to suppress on March 22, 2004. On March 29, 2004 Hoeper filed a motion to dismiss based on speedy-trial grounds. The court denied the motion on April 6, 2004. Hoeper then waived his right to a jury trial, and following a trial on the minutes of evidence the district court found Hoeper guilty of operating while intoxicated.
II. Speedy Trial Violation.
A trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss based on speedy-trial grounds is reviewed for an abuse of discretion State v. Winters, 690 N.W.2d 903, 907 (Iowa 2005). The district court’s discretion in ruling on such motions is narrow. Id.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.33(2)(b) states:
If a defendant indicted for a public offense has not waived the defendant’s right to a speedy trial the defendant must be brought to trial within 90 days after indictment is found or the court must order the indictment to be dismissed unless good cause to the contrary be shown.
Accordingly, a criminal charge not brought to trial within ninety days of indictment must be dismissed unless the State proves the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial, the delay is attributable to the defendant, or there is good cause for the delay. Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908.
The speedy-trial deadline in this case was March 7, 2004. Trial was not held until April 8, 2004. Hoeper did not waive his right to a speedy trial. In denying the March 29, 2004 motion to dismiss, the district court found the delay was attributable to Hoeper. Specifically, the court stated that the delay was caused by Hoeper’s February 9, 2004 motion to suppress and by trial counsel’s request for additional time.
The time required for the court to rule on motions filed by a defendant can amount to delay attributable to the defendant and constitute good cause for the failure to comply with the speedy-trial deadline. State v. Miller, 637 N.W.2d 201, 204-05
(Iowa 2001). However, filing timely pre-trial motions does not waive a defendant’s right to be tried within the speedy-trial deadline. Winters, 690 N.W.2d at 908. The pre-trial process is set up to normally dispose of pre-trial motions within the speedy-trial deadline. Id. at 908-09.
Hoeper’s motion to suppress was filed almost a full month before the speedy-trial deadline. On February 11, 2004, the district court set the motion for hearing on March 17, 2004, ten days after the speedy-trial deadline and more than five weeks after Hoeper’s motion was filed. Hoeper’s motion could have been heard and ruled on before the speedy-trial deadline. Accordingly, the delay cannot be attributable to him.
We also note that following the February 2, 2004 pre-trial conference, the district court scheduled trial for March 11, 2004, four days past the speedy-trial deadline. In its written record of the pre-trial conference the court stated trial would be rescheduled because Hoeper requested additional time prior to trial. The court then re-scheduled the trial date to nearly a full month after the original February 12, 2004 trial date. Additional time did not require trial to be scheduled past the speedy-trial deadline.
We reject the district court’s conclusion that any request by Hoeper for additional time[1] was cause for the delay beyond the speedy trial deadlines. We conclude the State failed to carry the burden to prove one or more of the three grounds for not bringing Hoeper to trial within ninety days of the filing of the trial information and that the district court therefore abused its narrow discretion in denying Hoeper’s motion to dismiss the charge against him on speedy-trial grounds. Accordingly, we must reverse the judgment on his conviction and remand to the district court to dismiss the trial information. We need not reach the other issue raised on this appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.