No. 5-578 / 04-1395Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed September 28, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, William J. Pattinson, Judge.
Kevin Ray Stevenson appeals from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual offender. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer Miller, County Attorney, and Paul G. Crawford, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
HECHT, P.J.
Kevin Ray Stevenson appeals from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual offender. He maintains the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Stevenson is the stepfather of L.M., who at the time of the alleged incidents involved in this case was sixteen years old. In March of 2002, L.M. was placed in the Quakerdale living shelter and later moved to the Toledo Juvenile Home. While in those placements, L.M. informed counselors that she had been sexually abused by Stevenson. Those allegations were later reported to Marshalltown police officers. Based on those allegations, and certain allegations concerning another alleged victim, the State charged Stevenson with five counts of third-degree sexual abuse, one count of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, and one count of assault causing bodily injury. Six of the seven charges related to the other alleged victim. The trial on those charges was later severed from the trial of the charge involved in this case.
At trial, L.M. testified regarding at least three incidents. In the first incident, L.M. claimed that Stevenson walked in on her while she was showering. He asked her to exit the shower, unzipped his pants, and placed his penis between her breasts while she knelt down. He then made “white liquid” come out of his penis, and told L.M. to get back in the shower to wash it off. In another instance, L.M. claimed that while giving her a ride home one evening, Stevenson stopped the vehicle and made more “white stuff come out” of his penis and asked her to taste it. She complied and placed her mouth on his penis. In the final incident, L.M. testified that one evening Stevenson followed her into her bedroom where he told her to lay down on the bed and rubbed her vagina with his fingers. She further testified that she did not ask him to stop because she was scared of how he would react.
Following a trial, the jury found Stevenson guilty of third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code sections 709.4(1) and 902.9(3) (2003). The court later denied Stevenson’s motion for new trial and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years. Stevenson appeals from this ruling.
New Trial Standards.
We review a denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Iowa 1997). The district court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for new trial. Id. When considering a motion for new trial, the district court must apply the weight-of-the-evidence standard State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence where a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or cause than the other. Id. at 658. Trial courts must use their discretion to grant a new trial “sparingly” for fear of lessening the role of the jury as the principal trier of fact. Id. at 659.
On a weight-of-the-evidence claim, appellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court, not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 203
(Iowa 2003). The appellate court is limited to examining the evidence produced at trial to determine whether the district court’s determination that the evidence does or does not “preponderate heavily against the verdict” is a clear and manifest abuse of discretion. Id. To establish such abuse, the defendant must show that the district court exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. Id. at 202.
Merits.
On appeal, Stevenson points out various alleged inconsistencies in L.M.’s versions of the events, notes other credibility issues, and directs us to testimony indicating that L.M. has a penchant for lying. He asserts “[t]hese factors, together with other inconsistencies demonstrate both insufficient evidence upon which to convict, and a verdict that fails to rest upon sufficient evidentiary weight.” While the State appears to concede that certain inconsistencies exist in the record and that some credibility issues may have arisen, it essentially argues those issues were insufficient, considering the other credible evidence supporting the verdict, to warrant a new trial.
Credibility of witnesses is key in a weight-of-the-evidence determination. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 207. Determinations of credibility are in most instances left for the trier of fact, who is in a better position to evaluate witnesses. State v. Weaver, 608 N.W.2d 797, 804 (Iowa 2000). We give great weight to a district court’s credibility findings. State v. O’Shea, 634 N.W.2d 150, 156 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). While the record certainly supports that L.M.’s testimony was subject to certain inconsistencies and that her credibility reasonably may have been questioned, these observations are insufficient for this court to conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying Stevenson’s motion.
We conclude the evidence simply does not “preponderate heavily against the verdict.” L.M. testified with reasonable specificity as to her allegations and their timing. The greater amount of th credible evidence supported Stevenson’s conviction. The district court properly concluded “nothing about [L.M.’s] testimony or anything else in the case completely diminished her capacity as a truthful witness or otherwise rendered her testimony a nullity.” We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s assessment of the weight of the evidence and therefore affirm Stevenson’s conviction for third-degree sexual abuse as a habitual offender.
AFFIRMED.