STROUD v. SINGLE SOURCE TRANSPORTATION, 699 N.W.2d 685 (Iowa App. 2005)

No. 5-324 / 04-1070Court of Appeals of Iowa.
Filed May 25, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Carla T. Schemmel, Judge.

Ronald Stroud appeals the denial of his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.

Martin Ozga of Max Schott Associates, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

John E. Swanson and Aaron T. Oliver of Hanson, McClintock
Riley, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Vaitheswaran, JJ.

SACKETT, C.J.

Ronald Stroud appeals the denial of his claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Stroud claims there was not substantial evidence to support the agency’s determination that his continuing complaints are not related to a work injury. Furthermore, Stroud argues he is entitled to alternative medical care, his rate of payment for temporary total disability was incorrectly calculated, and Single Source is responsible for additional medical expenses and costs associated with this claim. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS.

Ronald Stroud worked as a truck driver for Single Source Transportation Company, with his wife as part of a driving team. On August 30, 2000, after arriving at a location to make a pick-up, Stroud was cleaning some debris out of the truck when he slipped and began to fall. Stroud was able to catch himself before falling but claims he immediately suffered back pain in the form of a sharp pain in his lower back and left leg. Stroud informed the dispatcher of the injury shortly thereafter and was advised to see his family physician. Stroud was unable to drive the load, so he lay down in the truck while his wife drove back.

Stroud did see his family physician, Dr. Joel Wells, the next day. The assessment of Dr. Wells was that Stroud was suffering from left leg radicular pain. At a follow-up visit on September 5, 2000, Stroud reported that he was doing somewhat better. However, by September 12, 2000, Stroud was experiencing more difficulties with lower back pain and numbness and weakness of his left leg.

An MRI was conducted on September 14, 2000 and showed there was disc dehydration at L4-5 and L5-S1. Additionally, there was a slight bulging disc at L5-S1. Based on these findings, the treating physician, Dr. Rosenfeld, recommended steroid injections. Stroud received two injections, reporting that the first injection helped but the second injection resulted in more back problems.

On December 1, 2000, Stroud again saw Dr. Rosenfeld, who recommended a surgical operation due to the failure of the conservative treatment. Dr. Rosenfeld sought approval from Stroud’s workers’ compensation carrier. Stroud’s carrier declined the physician’s request in order to review Stroud’s medical history and determine whether to conduct an independent medial evaluation. Stroud was prescribed pain relievers to alleviate his pain.

An independent medical examination was eventually conducted by Dr. Bernard Kratochvil on May 14, 2001. Dr. Kratochvil reviewed the MRI and concluded that the disc dehydration and slight disc bulging were the result of the aging process, and not caused by any injury. Based on his evaluation of Stroud and review of the medical records, Dr. Kratochvil concluded Stroud had suffered a muscle strain and he had not suffered permanent impairment resulting from the incident on August 30, 2000. Dr. Kratochvil further concluded Stroud had reached maximum medical improvement of that strain and Stroud’s continued complaints were not the result of his work activities.

Stroud continued to seek treatment. He visited his family physician, Dr. Wells, for a period. Dr. Wells’ treatment sought to reduce Stroud’s pain with the continued prescription of pain medication. Eventually, Stroud was terminated by Single Source and lost his medical insurance. After losing his insurance, Stroud sought treatment at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center. A repeat MRI was ordered by the VA. An MRI was conducted on October 17, 2001, which showed a small disc herniation, bulging, and degeneration that was not present in the first MRI. Stroud again visited Dr. Rosenfeld in August 2002. After conducting a physical examination and reviewing the MRI results, Dr. Rosenfeld concluded the symptoms began with Stroud’s slip on August 30, 2000, and the symptoms were causally related to that incident. Dr. Rosenfeld recommended surgical treatment, and stated he did not believe that Stroud had reached maximum medical improvement.

Stroud filed a workers’ compensation petition in November 2001. He claimed he was injured August 30, 2000 when he slipped while throwing trash from the trailer of his truck. On November 26, 2002 a hearing was held before Deputy Commissioner Steve Beasley. The deputy filed his decision on December 19, 2002. The deputy concluded Stroud failed prove he was entitled to permanent disability benefits and concluded Stroud was entitled to no further temporary total disability benefits after May 14, 2001. On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner entered a decision affirming the deputy on November 6, 2003. Stroud then sought judicial review. On May 21, 2004, the district court affirmed the agency decision in its entirety.

Stroud appeals. Stroud first argues he is entitled to healing period benefits from the date of the last payment until the present and continuing. In the alternative, Stroud argues he is entitled to industrial disability benefits. Additionally, Stroud argues (1) he is entitled to alternative medical care under Iowa Code section 85.27 (2001); (2) the rate for temporary total disability benefits was incorrectly calculated; (3) certain medical expenses should be paid pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.27; and (4) certain costs associated with this action should be paid by Single Source.

II. SCOPE OF REVIEW.

Our scope of review is governed by the judicial review provisions of Iowa Code chapter 17A.19(10). Wal-Mart Stores,Inc. v. Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 498 (Iowa 2003). Our review under Iowa Code chapter 17A is for correction of errors at law, not de novo. Id.

Section 17A.19(10), is a relatively new provision, it provides greater specificity as to the principles of law applicable to judicial review. Locate.Plus.Com., Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 650 N.W.2d 609, 612 (Iowa 2002). The provision “reaffirms the notion that courts must not `simply rubber stamp the agency fact finding without engaging in a fairly intensive review of the record to ensure that the fact finding is itself reasonable.'” Caselman, 657 N.W.2d at 499 (quoting Arthur E. Bonfield, Amendments to Iowa Administrative Procedure Act
(1998) at 68)). An agency’s fact findings are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed as a whole. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). Substantial evidence is

the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.

Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(1); University of Iowa HospitalsClinics v. Waters, 674 N.W.2d 92, 95 (Iowa 2004).

III. ANALYSIS.

Stroud’s first contention is that the agency erred in concluding Stroud was not entitled to benefits after May 14, 2001, which was the date Dr. Kratochvil concluded Stroud’s continued complaints were not the result of work activities. In reaching its decision, the agency considered substantial conflicting evidence. Evidence supporting the agency decision includes the opinion of Dr. Kratochvil that Stroud suffered a back strain due to his work-related slip, which Stroud had recovered from by the date of his evaluation and other complaints of Stroud were related to the aging process. The agency’s decision was further supported by Stroud’s medical records, and Stroud’s own testimony. Ultimately, the deputy placed great weight on the opinion of Dr. Kratochvil, finding his opinion to be the most credible.

Stroud cites a substantial amount of other evidence that indicates his complaints continue to be caused by the injury he incurred due to his work-related slip. This includes the opinions of Dr. Wells and Dr. Rosenfeld, who indicated Stroud did suffer a work-related injury due to the slip that continues to disable him. Stroud also attempts to call into question the opinion of Dr. Kratochvil because Dr. Kratochvil frequently works for the defense side in similar cases, the examination conducted by Dr. Kratochvil was short, and Dr. Kratochvil did not examine Stroud until eight months after the injury.

While Stroud does cite significant evidence that supports his claim, as the district court noted, this evidence does not negate the substantiality of the evidence in support of the agency’s decision and the fact that the deputy makes the credibility findings in such cases. “In the case of a conflict in the evidence, we are not free to interfere with the commissioner’s findings.”

Dunlavey v. Economy Fire Cas. Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 849
(Iowa 1995) (citing Schreckengast v. Hammermills, Inc., 369 N.W.2d 809, 811 (Iowa 1985)). Therefore, we conclude that the agency properly cut off Stroud’s healing period benefits as of May 14, 2001. Furthermore, because we conclude Stroud does not continue to suffer from a work-related injury, he is not entitled to industrial disability benefits.

Having found that substantial evidence supports the agency’s conclusion Stroud does not continue to suffer from a work-related injury, Stroud is not entitled to have alternative medical care provided for by Single Source.

Stroud claims the correct rate for weekly benefits should have been $445.03, not the lower figure of $395.86 that was awarded. In so arguing, Stroud claims that weeks in which his gross payment was less than $500 should not be used in calculating his rate, as those weeks are not representative. Stroud argues they are not representative because there were occasional weeks when he did not get his miles reported to his employer in a timely fashion. However, Stroud was later paid for the work that was reported late, it was simply added to later pay periods. Thus, every paycheck that was abnormally low was followed by a paycheck that was abnormally high. To get an appropriate average, the low paycheck and high paychecks must all be averaged together. Stroud’s payment rate was correctly calculated.

Stroud claims certain medical expenses should be paid by Single Source. However, all expenses that Stroud seeks to have paid were subsequent to the determination that any treatment after May 14, 2001 was not casually related to the work injury. A determination that we have upheld. Single Source is not responsible for medical expenses that are unrelated to a work injury.

Finally, Stroud argues that costs should have been taxed to Single Source. We conclude the commissioner reasonably exercised his discretion in assessing costs as provided by Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.33.

AFFIRMED.