No. 162 / 01-1662Supreme Court of Iowa.
February 25, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, Jon Stuart Scoles, Judge.
Employer appeals and worker cross-appeals from district court judgment affirming workers’ compensation award. AFFIRMED ON BOTHAPPEALS.
Mark A. Soldat, Des Moines, for appellant.
Richard G. Book of Huber, Book, Cortese, Happe Lanz, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Donna Zeigler, an employee of Fleetguard, Inc., was awarded workers’ compensation benefits. The district court on judicial review modified and affirmed the award. Fleetguard and its insurer Travelers Insurance Company (collectively Fleetguard) appealed and Zeigler cross-appealed. We affirm on both appeals.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings.
Zeigler sustained various injuries while employed at Fleetguard. She had surgery on her right hand in 1985 and surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome in 1993. In March 1997 she developed right shoulder pain and consulted her doctor. In March 1998 she had surgery on her right shoulder. Zeigler filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, claiming injuries to “both upper extremities, including shoulders and upper back.” In June 2000 a deputy workers’ compensation commissioner found a seventy percent industrial disability and ordered permanent partial disability, healing-period, and penalty benefits. In January 2001 the chief deputy, acting as the workers’ compensation commissioner, affirmed, except for a minor adjustment regarding healing-period benefits and an adjustment of the penalty accordingly. On February 27 and 28, 2001, respectively, Zeigler and Fleetguard petitioned for judicial review. On September 19, 2001, the district court basically affirmed the agency’s decision. Fleetguard appealed and Zeigler cross-appealed to this court.
II. Issues.
The issues in this appeal concern the amount of benefits, interest, and penalty awarded by the commissioner. Another issue, not involved in this appeal, concerns Fleetguard’s right to stay the execution on Zeigler’s judgment for workers’ compensation benefits under Iowa Code section 86.42 (2001) (providing for conversion of workers’ compensation award into district court judgment). We resolved that issue in Zeigler v. Fleetguard, Inc., ___ N.W.2d ___ (Iowa 2004) (filed today).
III. Principles of Review.
Our review of the district court’s decisions on the substantive issues raised is limited to a consideration of whether the district court correctly applied the law. Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 310 (Iowa 1996) (citing Norland v. Dep’t of Job Serv., 412 N.W.2d 904, 908 (Iowa 1987)). On these issues, the commissioner’s findings of fact are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence. Chariton Feed Grain, Inc. v. Harder, 369 N.W.2d 777, 782 (Iowa 1985). On another issue, the assessment of costs, our review is for abuse of discretion Robbenholt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 238 (Iowa 1996). In reviewing the taxation of costs, we consider the relative success of the parties on the issues raised. Id.
IV. The Disability Rating.
Fleetguard argues that the workers’ compensation commissioner erroneously based Zeigler’s percentage of disability for her shoulder injury of March 25, 1998, in part on Zeigler’s evidence of industrial disability that resulted from her carpal tunnel syndrome and the other upper-extremity conditions that occurre after the shoulder injury on which her claim was based. Fleetguard’s complaint is that “Zeigler is suffering from bilateral overuse syndrome and . . . this does not have anything to do with her previous rotator cuff tear [the injury for which she seeks compensation].” Fleetguard complains that the disability rating is inflated because in his decision the commissioner did not distinguish between the disability caused by the carpal tunnel syndrome and other upper extremity conditions prior to the 1998 shoulder injury and the disability caused by the upper extremity conditions after the 1998 injury. It is clear from the decision that the commissioner’s decision was heavily influenced by the disability caused by the carpal tunnel and upper extremity conditions subsequent to the 1998 shoulder injury.
Zeigler responds, in part, that the commissioner did not factor in the subsequent events but only discussed them as being among the proper considerations in determining disability in the same way as age, education, work experience, and other factors are considered. Zeigler also challenges the seventy-percent rating, claiming in her cross-appeal that the medical evidence did not support a finding of only seventy percent industrial disability and 350 weeks of benefits based on that rating. According to her, the award should have been larger.
We disagree with both Zeigler and Fleetguard; the commissioner recited in detail the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing and on which he relied in setting the disability at seventy percent. We need not recite that evidence here; suffice it to say that substantial evidence supports his findings. We also conclude that substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s award of penalty benefits; we reject Zeigler’s argument that the penalty award should be larger, as well as Fleetguard’s argument that it should be smaller.
The last issue concerns the district court’s taxation of costs in the judicial review case. As previously noted, this is a matter for the district court’s exercise of discretion Robbenholt, 555 N.W.2d at 238. Fleetguard contends that the court abused its discretion by taxing all of the costs to Fleetguard. When taxing costs, the court is to consider the success of the applicant for judicial review. Id. The court discussed this general rule, assessed the relative success of the parties, and taxed all of the costs to Fleetguard. While another conclusion might have been warranted, we find no abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.